By all accounts, the appellant Tracy Kitch’s three-year tenure as Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of the Halifax IWK Children’s Hospital (“IWK”) was satisfactory, save one noteworthy exception. Over time, Ms. Kitch’s use of her corporate credit card, and her claiming and reporting of expenses, came under a degree of scrutiny that ultimately led to her resignation. The following year she was charged with fraud contrary to Section 380(1) of the Criminal Code and fraud by a public officer contrary to Section 122 of the Code. Convicted on both counts, Ms. Kitch filed an appeal to this Court. The appeal was granted with reasons to follow. These are those reasons.
 The appellant began her tenure as CEO in September 2014. She signed a five-year employment contract which, among other matters, required her to abide by all policies and procedures in effect at the IWK. The contract contemplated reimbursement for her documented business-related expenses and travel, and a relocation allowance to assist in her move to Halifax. The appellant was provided a corporate credit card, and acknowledged in writing that it was not for personal use.
 Soon into her term, IWK staff began to experience difficulties in tracking and documenting the appellant’s business versus personal expenses. The problem continued over time, involving various IWK personnel attempting to identify personal expenses of the appellant charged on her corporate credit card, personal travel by the appellant using IWK-purchased flight passes, and personal expenses invoiced directly to the IWK….
 In October 2016 the provincial government issued a requirement that executives’ expenses be posted online. This obligation captured the appellant in her role. Eventually, media attention came to bear on the appellant’s expense history, which led to discussions between her and two successive IWK Board of Directors chairs regarding the accuracy and veracity of her expense claims. By September 2017 the scrutiny was so intense that the appellant, having by then reimbursed the IWK thousands of dollars for personal expenses, resigned. In October 2018 she was charged with the fraud offences.
 A 12-day trial was held before Judge Paul Scovil of the Provincial Court (“the judge”) in November 2021. The judge heard from 19 witnesses and received dozens of documentary exhibits, some numbering hundreds of pages in length. In February 2022, he convicted the appellant of both offences and stayed the s. 122 charge (R. v. Kitch, 2022 NSPC 4). She was later sentenced to five months’ custody, to be followed by 12 months’ probation. The appellant launched an appeal of both conviction and sentence and was released on bail pending appeal, with conditions.
 For the purposes of this decision, I reorganize and focus on these questions:
(a) Did the judge err in not linking his factual findings to the elements of each of the offences?
(b) Did the judge err with respect to sufficiency of reasons?
(c) Did the judge err in not reconciling conflicting evidence?
 Turning to the first issue, the appellant asserts the judge erred in not making sufficient factual findings to support all of the elements of the two offences charged. This requires consideration of what the Crown was required to prove. The Supreme Court of Canada has previously provided direction:
(a) in relation to a charge of fraud contrary to s. 380(1), the following elements must be proved:
(i) a dishonest act, established by proof of deceit, falsehood or other fraudulent means,
(ii) deprivation, established by proof of detriment, prejudice or risk of prejudice to the economic interests of the victim, caused by that act,
(iii) the accused’s subjective knowledge of their prohibited act,
(iv) the accused’s subjective knowledge the prohibited act could result in the deprivation of another (including knowledge the other’s pecuniary interests are at risk).
See R. v. Théroux,  2 SCR 5 at paras. 16, 24, 27.
(b) in relation to a charge of breach of trust contrary to s. 122, the fraud must likewise be made out, with the following additional elements also proved:
(i) the accused was an official,
(ii) the accused was acting in connection with the duties of their office,
(iii) the accused breached the standard of responsibility and conduct demanded by the nature of the office,
(iv) the accused’s conduct was a serious and marked departure from the standards expected of one in the accused’s position of public trust,
(v) the accused acted with the intention to use the public office for a purpose other than the public good (for example, a dishonest, partial, corrupt or oppressive purpose).
See R. v. Boulanger, 2006 SCC 32 at para. 58.
 The judge’s reasons do not reveal, even obliquely, how he applied these legal requirements to the facts of the case. Although the judge reviewed the factual circumstances in his reasons, he did not explain how they supported his ultimate conclusion the Crown had met its burden.
 The bulk of the judge’s decision contains a recounting of the circumstances, which must reasonably be inferred to constitute his factual findings. The judge then identified the legal test(s) to be applied, following which he went directly to the conclusions reached, without setting out a bridge of analysis to link the facts to those conclusions. It is not possible to discern from the judge’s reasons whether the law, which he both cited and is presumed to know, was properly applied.
 Concerning the actus reus of the offences, the appellant asserts while there was no dispute before the judge that her actions likely breached IWK policy, it was nonetheless incumbent on the judge to identify how such a violation would amount to dishonesty. The appellant says the judge erred in appearing to “fixate” on a breach of IWK policy, implying that the dishonesty or dishonest nature of the act could be found in that breach. The Crown responds the judge’s conclusion the policy breaches “crossed the line” to criminal behaviour are supported by the evidence at trial that the appellant “failed to flag the majority of her personal expenses”, “failed to pay back most of those personal expenses until public scrutiny fell” on them, and led others to believe “improper personal expenses were being paid back”.
 In Landry c. R., 2022 QCCA 1186, the Quebec Court of Appeal drew on the history of the Supreme Court of Canada’s discussions in Théroux, R. v. Zlatic, 2 SCR 29 and R. v. Riesberry, 2015 SCC 65 to set out the requirements for the actus reus and mens rea of fraud:
 In 1978, Canadian fraud law evolved decisively in the continuation of the Supreme Court's decision in Olan which is based on several English decisions.
 In this decision, the Supreme Court espouses "an interpretation liberal of [this] offence". The Dickson C.J. adopts the "risk of harm" test set out in the English decision R. v. Allsop:
Deprivation is established if [it] proves that the pecuniary interests of the victim have suffered damage or harm or there is a risk of harm to them. It is not essential that the fraud leads to a real pecuniary loss. The excerpt R. v. Allsop, from the judgment of the Court of Appeal of England, describes well, in my opinion, the state of the law on the role of pecuniary loss in the Fraud (at pp. 31-32):
In general, a fraudster wants to gain an advantage first and foremost. The harm caused to its victim is secondary and incidental. It is "intentional" only because it is part of the expected result of the fraud. If the deception puts at risk the pecuniary interests of the person misled, this is sufficient to constitute fraud, even if no actual loss results and even if the fraudster did not intend to cause any real loss.
 In 1990, in Pereira, Proulx J. of this Court observes that, according to "this modern conception, fraud encompasses necessarily other forms of appropriation of goods that were formerly very compartmentalized and were the subject of scholarly debate. Since Olan, supra, these debates have become very rare".
 Fraud has two main elements, the prohibited act (the actus reus) and the required state of mind (the mens rea).
 The actus reus has two elements: 1) the dishonest act and (2) deprivation.
 The dishonest act is established by the proof of a deception, a lying or “other fraudulent means”. The deprivation element is established if it is proved that, as a result of the dishonest act, the pecuniary interests of the victim has suffered damage or injury or there has been a risk of harm to him.
 The mental element of fraud requires two states of mind: 1) subjective knowledge of the prohibited act and 2) subjective knowledge that the prohibited act could cause deprivation to another person (which may consist in the knowledge that the pecuniary interests of the victim are jeopardized).
[emphasis added; footnotes omitted]
 Here, the judge’s analysis of the mens rea and actus reus of the s. 380(1) fraud charge is exquisitely brief:
 While Ms. Kitch may have been an exemplary CEO in many other areas, the question here was her use of corporate funds fraudulently.
 As CEO, and having signed documents relating to the same, Ms. Kitch clearly had knowledge that the use of flight passes, and corporate credit cards were not to be used for personal expenditures. Additionally, each and every expense claim contained certification that they were proper charges. They obviously were not.
 The numerous flights to and from Toronto for no reason other than personal travel to her home were booked utilizing flight passes paid for by the IWK on an unauthorized basis.
 Personal use of corporate funds was clear in taxi charges, hotel stays for relatives, iTunes, Netflix, and data overages. Using a rental car for personal use and not advising of, or paying the parking tickets related to the same, fall within the area of fraudulent activity. It should also be noted Ms. Kitch assured two separate Board Chairs that her expenses were in order, when they clearly were not.
 The evidence also contains the fact that Ms. Kitch repaid the IWK of over $45,000 for personal expenditures that were incurred by the IWK.
 The evidence before the court clearly showed that Ms. Kitch used corporate funds for personal expenses, placing IWK funds in potential peril.
 On the basis of all the evidence, I find the accused guilty of the one count of fraud.
 The judge’s treatment of the elements of the s. 122 charge suffers from the same frailty:
 The leading case regarding this section is R. v. Boulanger,  2 S.C.R. 49. There the Supreme Court of Canada set out the elements the Crown needs to prove in this matter. They are:
- The accused is an official;
The accused was acting in connection with the duties of her office;
- The accused breached the standard of responsibility and conduct
- demanded of her by the nature of the office;
- The conduct of the accused represented a serious and marked departure from the standards expected of an individual in the accused’s position of public trust; and
- The accused acted with the intention to use her public office for a purpose other than public good.
 Here, Ms. Kitch was a very high ranking public servant.
 Her action utilized the credit which came with her office to obtain personal enrichment. Given her position as the Chief Operating Officer of a Children’s Hospital, which services the entire Maritime region, it demands the strictest adherence to a high ethical standard. Ms. Kitch clearly breached that standard. There can be no doubt that the flagrant abuse of flight passes and credit cards are a marked departure from her position of public trust. The actions taken by Ms. Kitch in her criminal use of public funds can not be seen as other than against the public good.
[emphasis in original]
 The trial took almost 2.5 weeks of court time and, as the judge broadly described it, “involved a large number of documentary exhibits and a number of witnesses”. Yet without knowledge of the record put before the judge, respectfully, I do not see it possible for a reader of the above passages to appreciate the length and breadth of the information the judge needed to assess, nor to garner how that assessment was performed.
 Despite the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent caution to appellate courts to refrain from assessing reasons “removed from the live issues at trial” (G.F. at para. 83), it is not possible to appreciate why the judge was left without reasonable doubt. The judge provided “the what” - his conclusion of the appellant’s guilt - but not “the why” of how he made that decision (R. v. R.E.M., 2008 SCC 51 at para. 17).
 The judge’s decision gives rise to the question whether convictions were entered because of a procedural, policy or ethical breach by the appellant. Such a breach(es) does not, on its own, translate directly to a conviction for fraud or fraud by a public officer. However, the judge’s statements the appellant engaged in “unauthorized” use of flight passes or that “using” a rental car for “personal use” was “fraudulent activity” do not illuminate his reasoning, absent any amplification of his analysis. [PJM Emphasis]
 The judge did not have to provide exhaustive reasons that touched on each and every aspect of the evidence. However, we do not know how the judge reached his determination of the actus reus - the guilty act - in relation to the offence of fraud.
 The judge’s analysis also prevents appreciation of his consideration of the mens rea of the offences. For example, the judge remarked on the appellant having repaid monies to her employer. In what way, if at all, did this factor in to his determination of her culpability? One cannot be sure. The judge also said certain charges made by the appellant “fall within the area of fraudulent activity” and that she had placed “IWK funds in peril”. Do these observations go to the mens rea of the offences? That question cannot be answered with certainty. Without a demonstration of the process of connecting his factual findings to the conclusions he reached it is not possible to grasp how any of what the judge did discuss informed his ultimate determination.
 Gaps in the judge’s reasons discussed above seep into and are to some degree replicated in another ground of appeal raised by the appellant, that of sufficiency of reasons. The seminal decision in R v. Sheppard, 2002 SCC 26 was the spearhead for a series of Supreme Court of Canada decisions heralding a more contemporary approach to the need for “reasoned reasons”:
22 There is a general sense in which a duty to give reasons may be said to be owed to the public rather than to the parties to a specific proceeding. Through reasoned decisions, members of the general public become aware of rules of conduct applicable to their future activities. An awareness of the reasons for a rule often helps define its scope for those trying to comply with it. The development of the common law proceeds largely by reasoned analogy from established precedents to new situations. Few would argue, however, that failure to discharge this jurisprudential function necessarily gives rise to appellate intervention. New trials are ordered to address the potential need for correction of the outcome of a particular case. Poor reasons may coincide with a just result. Serious remedies such as a new trial require serious justification.
23 On a more specific level, within the confines of a particular case, it is widely recognized that having to give reasons itself concentrates the judicial mind on the difficulties that are presented [citations omitted]. The absence of reasons, however, does not necessarily indicate an absence of such concentration. We are speaking here of the articulation of the reasons rather than of the reasoning process itself. The challenge for appellate courts is to ensure that the latter has occurred despite the absence, or inadequacy, of the former.
 Sheppard enumerated the assumptions engaged when assessing sufficiency of reasons:
- Judges are presumed to know the law.
- Judges do not need to discuss all of the evidence put before them in providing the decision.
- Judges do not need to identify each and every conclusion reached nor resolve each and every inconsistency in the evidence.
- Judges do not need to take a formalistic approach to giving reasons.
- Judges are not held to a standard of perfection in giving reasons.
 R. v. Braich, 2002 SCC 27 continued the Court’s progressive perspective on a judge’s task of providing reasons, echoed again the following year in R.E.M., when appellate courts were reminded that: “. . . [t]he object is not to show how the judge arrived at his or her conclusion, in a ‘watch me think’ fashion. It is rather to show why the judge made that decision” (para. 17). What the judge concluded must be linked to why it was concluded, and the connection between the two must be identifiable and understandable:
 However, R.E.M. also emphasized the restraint to be exercised on appellate review:
 If the answers to these questions are affirmative, the reasons are not deficient, notwithstanding lack of detail and notwithstanding the fact that they are less than ideal. The trial judge should not be found to have erred in law for failing to describe every consideration leading to a finding of credibility, or to the conclusion of guilt or innocence. Nor should error of law be found because the trial judge has failed to reconcile every frailty in the evidence or allude to every relevant principle of law. Reasonable inferences need not be spelled out. [...] Finally, appellate courts must guard against simply sifting through the record and substituting their own analysis of the evidence for that of the trial judge because the reasons do not comply with their idea of ideal reasons. [...]
 The Supreme Court of Canada reviewed Sheppard’s functional approach in G.F. The Court’s comments illustrate this functional approach to the inquiry into sufficiency of reasons continues (paras. 69 and 74).
 Here the judge’s reasons spanned 16 pages. Length of reasons is immaterial as they are “...not measured by the inch or the pound...” (R. v. Lagace,  OJ No. 4328, 178 O.A.C. 391 (ONCA) at para. 32). Rather, the appropriate focus is on these questions: does the judge’s decision permit a functional and contextual understanding of his reasons and conclusions? Is meaningful appellate review possible? I do not read the judge’s reasons for conviction as:
 [...] sufficient to fulfill their functions of explaining why the accused was convicted or acquitted, providing public accountability and permitting effective appellate review. (R.E.M., supra)
 With respect, I am not persuaded the reasons, read as a whole, in the context of the evidence and arguments, adequately explain why the decision was reached in this case. I am unable to discern why the judge was satisfied, on the totality of the evidence, of the appellant’s guilt. The reasons do not reveal any consideration of the defence arguments, and thus we do not know how or if the judge viewed the evidence differently than was suggested by the defence. The error is not in the omission alone, but in reasons that fail to identify how the judge reached the verdicts beyond a reasonable doubt (R. v. Dinardo, 2008 SCC 24 at paras. 34-35). I do not see the judge’s reasons as sufficient to permit meaningful appellate review and avoid intervention by the Court (R. v. D.B., 2022 SKCA 76 at para. 65). As considered in G.F.:
 To succeed on appeal, the appellant’s burden is to demonstrate either error or the frustration of appellate review: Sheppard, at para. 54. Neither are demonstrated by merely pointing to ambiguous aspects of the trial decision. Where all that can be said is a trial judge may or might have erred, the appellant has not discharged their burden to show actual error or the frustration of appellate review. Where ambiguities in a trial judge’s reasons are open to multiple interpretations, those that are consistent with the presumption of correct application must be preferred over those that suggest error: R. v. C.L.Y., 2008 SCC 2,  1 S.C.R. 5, at paras. 10-12, citing R. v. Morrissey (1995), 22 O.R. (3d) 514 (C.A.), at pp. 523-25. It is only where ambiguities, in the context of the record as a whole, render the path taken by the trial judge unintelligible that appellate review is frustrated: Sheppard, at para. 46. An appeal court must be rigorous in its assessment, looking to the problematic reasons in the context of the record as a whole and determining whether or not the trial judge erred or appellate review was frustrated. It is not enough to say that a trial judge’s reasons are ambiguous — the appeal court must determine the extent and significance of the ambiguity.
 I refer to my earlier discussion of the judge not connecting the facts of the case to the elements of the offences, and its overlap with this second of the appellant’s arguments. To the extent the reasons do not reveal that critical connection, there is an inherent ambiguity.
 A further ambiguity relates to the judge’s lone credibility finding.
Following a multiple day trial with numerous witnesses, the judge made no distinct or particular credibility findings in his decision, stating only “Trial Judges are often called on to resolve credibility between witnesses. In this matter, all the witnesses were credible.”
 Both the appellant and the Crown agree the case before the judge did not turn on issues of credibility. Nonetheless, credibility was an important consideration because, while the defence called no evidence, not all Crown witnesses who testified were in agreement with one another. For example, there was conflicting evidence as between Ms. Lucio, Executive Assistant to the appellant, whom the judge characterized as a “key Crown witness,” and Ms. Feron, IWK legal counsel. Their evidence diverged sharply on several points, including about particular instructions given to staff concerning assumption by the IWK of certain of the appellant’s personal expenses. Yet we know nothing of the judge’s view of this evidence despite it potentially going to the dishonesty element of the offences.
 In my view the judge’s reasons do not permit the Court to go as far as concluding “the trial decision can be rendered more comprehensible when read in the context of the record” (Bruno v. Dacosta, 2020 ONCA 602 at para. 23).
 In conclusion, it is not for this Court to attempt to articulate the findings or infer the credibility determinations the judge does not appear to have made, or if he did, have not been sufficiently explained. Regrettably, the decision does not provide “an intelligible pathway to the result” the judge reached (R. v. Assi, 2023 MBCA 2 at para. 6). The error rests in this Court being left unable to conduct the meaningful appellate review contemplated in the jurisprudence and articulated in R.E.M.:
 [...]To conduct meaningful appellate review, the court must be able to discern the foundation of the conviction. Essential findings of credibility must have been made, and critical issues of law must have been resolved. If the appellate court concludes that the trial judge on the record as a whole did not deal with the substance of the critical issues on the case (as was the case in Sheppard and Dinardo), then, and then only, is it entitled to conclude that the deficiency of the reasons constitute error in law.
 For the foregoing reasons the appeal was allowed, the convictions quashed and a new trial ordered.