[September 8, 2023] Charter s.8/9: Arrest and Search in Breach of Good Samaritan Law [Reasons by Leurer J.A. with Schwann and Drennan JJ.A. concurring]
AUTHOR’S NOTE: Death from drug overdoses remains at an all time high in Canada. The "war on drugs" approach has been discredited and has failed in the past and thankfully governments here are tending to stay away from it. The Good Samaritan law presents the opposite side of the coin and imports harm reduction into the law. In s.4.1(2) of the CDSA, there is a built in exception to possession offences that come to light due to people remaining at the scene of a medical emergency. In this case, a police arrest for simple possession turned into a drugs and guns seizure. However, the Court of Appeal found a s.8/9 violation on the search incident to arrest because police could not arrest in the circumstances for drug possession. Exclusion of evidence under 24(2) was necessary to ensure the purpose of the Good Samaritan Drug Overdose Act was not undone.
 Can the police arrest someone found committing an offence when that person cannot be lawfully charged with it?
 In 2017, Parliament passed the Good Samaritan Drug Overdose Act, SC 2017, c 4 [Good Samaritan Act]. It amended the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, SC 1996, c 19 [CDSA], to add new provisions intended to reduce deaths caused from drug overdoses. Because of these amendments, s. 4.1(2) of the CDSA now provides as follows:
Exemption — medical emergency
4.1(2) No person who seeks emergency medical or law enforcement assistance because that person, or another person, is suffering from a medical emergency is to be charged or convicted of an offence under subsection 4(1) if the evidence in support of that offence was obtained or discovered as a result of that person having sought assistance or having remained at the scene.
Subsection 4(1) of the CDSA creates the offence of the simple possession of a controlled substance.
 The appellant, Paul Wilson, remained at the scene of a drug overdose. After the police arrived, Mr. Wilson and his companions were detained for the purposes of an investigation of possession of a controlled substance contrary to s. 4(1) of the CDSA. Shortly thereafter, they were arrested for that offence. Incidental to that arrest, the police conducted a search, which led to the discovery of firearms and evidence of drug trafficking. These discoveries resulted in Mr. Wilson being arrested a second time, this time for drug trafficking and firearm offences. He was eventually charged, and convicted, of several firearm offences.
 As I will discuss, because Mr. Wilson could not be charged with simple possession of a controlled substance, his first arrest was unlawful. This means that his rights under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms were violated by the search that was incidental to it. I am also satisfied that the admission of the evidence obtained because of the unlawful search would, in the circumstances of this case, bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Without that evidence, the Crown has no case against Mr. Wilson. Accordingly, Mr. Wilson’s appeal must be allowed and an acquittal of the charges against him must be entered.
A. Outline of events
 Shortly before 9:00 a.m. on the morning of September 10, 2020, Mr. Wilson was with three others – Cheryl Delorme, Natasha Kerfoot and James Mann – driving a truck in Vanscoy, Saskatchewan, when Ms. Delorme slipped into unconsciousness after using fentanyl. One member of the group called 911 to report the drug overdose. Constable Heidi Jo Marshall from the Warman RCMP detachment was dispatched to the scene.
 When Cst. Marshall arrived on the scene, EMS personnel were already attending to Ms. Delorme. Another woman – later determined to be Ms. Kerfoot – was at the driver’s side of the truck. Two men – later determined to be Mr. Wilson and Mr. Mann – were laying on their backs beneath the vehicle, apparently attempting to repair one of the tires. Constable Marshall observed a clear bag containing a white substance, which appeared to be crystal meth, on the ground near the driver’s side of the truck, and she smelled the odour of marijuana coming from the truck.
 Following a conversation with the EMS supervisor and making additional observations, Cst.Marshall detained Mr.Wilson, Ms.Kerfoot and Mr.Mann for a CDSA investigation. Constable Marshall informed them of their right to counsel and provided a police warning. All three individuals asked to speak to a lawyer.
 Constable Marshall next observed a streak of a white substance near Mr. Wilson’s foot, which had not been there before. She believed this substance to be crystal meth. She also saw Mr. Wilson fiddling with something in his pockets. She then questioned Mr. Wilson about the substance. He removed a black case from his pocket, which contained syringes and other drug paraphernalia, but he denied that the substance on the ground was his. Mr. Wilson, Ms. Kerfoot and Mr. Mann were subsequently placed under arrest for simple possession of a controlled substance, being the offence under s. 4(1) of the CDSA.
 Incidental to the arrest for simple possession, the officers searched the truck and several bags located therein. In one of the bags, a backpack, the officers located modified handguns as well as what they took to be parts for firearms and a quantity of ammunition. In other bags, the officers also discovered scales, baggies and needles that were evidence of drug trafficking.
 Mr. Wilson initially appealed against his convictions and his sentence. In his factum, he abandoned his appeal from sentence, as well as all grounds pertaining to his conviction other than in connection with the alleged violation of his Charter rights. Considering this narrowing of the grounds of appeal, the outcome of his appeal is determined by the answers to these three questions:
(a) Why was Mr. Wilson first arrested?
(b) Were Mr. Wilson’s ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights violated?
(c) If Mr. Wilson’s Charter rights were violated, what consequences follow?
A. The reason for Mr. Wilson’s first arrest
 Mr. Wilson’s overarching submission is that his ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights were violated because his arrest was unlawful as (a) the Good Samaritan Act prohibited the police from arresting him for the purposes of charging him with simple possession of a controlled substance, and (b) the search leading to the discovery of the backpack and its contents was incidental to that prohibited arrest.
 In the analysis portion of his judgment, the trial judge did not make an express finding in relation to the first arrest of Mr. Wilson. However, in the brief extract that I quoted earlier, he stated that following the search of Ms. Delorme’s belongings, and the discovery of a large amount of drugs, Mr. Wilson and his companions were arrested “for the purpose of [the] trafficking offence”. As I will discuss, I do not interpret this as a finding of fact in relation to the first arrest of Mr. Wilson. However, if it were intended to be such, it is palpably wrong.
 Under cross-examination, Cst. Marshall reiterated that the first arrests were made for simple possession and that the search of the truck was incidental to that arrest. She also confirmed that it was only later that Mr. Wilson and his companions were arrested a second time: this time, for possession for the purposes of trafficking and for firearm offences.
 Constable Hamon-Boulay was unequivocal that it was only following the discovery of the backpack and the other evidence that Mr. Wilson was rearrested for possession of trafficking and possession of prohibited firearms:
Q And I’ll just have you continue from there?
A From there, I believe Constable Marshall advised that she had found what seems to be a drug, CDSA trafficking evidence, scales, baggies, needles, so she was telling me. So she asked me to read -- sorry, to arrest -- rearrest James Mann and Mr. Wilson here for possession of the purpose of trafficking and for possession of a prohibited firearm, which is what I proceeded to do.
 In my view, it is impossible to read the testimony of these officers in any way other than that the search of Mr. Wilson’s backpack was incidental to his arrest for simple possession of a controlled substance. He was only arrested on the other charges after the backpack was searched and its contents revealed.
 Based on the evidence before the trial judge, the only conclusions open to him were that (a) Mr. Wilson was first detained for the purposes of a police investigation into crimes under the CDSA; (b) at the time of the police search of the truck, the discovery of the backpack, and the search of its contents, Mr. Wilson and his companions were under arrest for simple possession of a controlled substance, contrary to s. 4(1) of the CDSA; (c) the search of the truck and the search of Mr. Wilson’s backpack, which resulted in the discovery of the firearms, were incidental to that first arrest; and (d) it was only later that Mr. Wilson was arrested a second time – “rearrested”, in the words of one of the officers – for the offences for which he was later charged. I add only one final footnote to this. In the trial judge’s subsequent ruling on the voluntariness of Mr. Wilson’s statement, he clearly evinced an understanding of these four facts.
B. The violation of Mr. Wilson’s Charter rights
Definition of medical emergency
4.1(1) For the purposes of this section, medical emergency means a physiological event induced by the introduction of a psychoactive substance into the body of a person that results in a life-threatening situation and in respect of which there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person requires emergency medical or law enforcement assistance.
Exemption — medical emergency
(2) No person who seeks emergency medical or law enforcement assistance because that person, or another person, is suffering from a medical emergency is to be charged or convicted of an offence under subsection 4(1) if the evidence in support of that offence was obtained or discovered as a result of that person having sought assistance or having remained at the scene.
Exemption — persons at the scene
(3) The exemption under subsection (2) also applies to any person, including the person suffering from the medical emergency, who is at the scene on the arrival of the emergency medical or law enforcement assistance.
 Mr. Wilson argues that police powers of arrest and detention “require an underlying nexus to criminal activity that arises from the facts presented to police officers”. He says that this nexus is absent here because s. 4.1 of the CDSA creates an exemption from criminal liability for simple possession charges given, as the section specifically provides, someone in his position cannot be “charged or convicted of an offence under subsection 4(1)”. In short, he submits that “if a person cannot be charged or convicted of an offence, then there is no underlying crime being committed”.
 Mr. Wilson also invites this Court to conclude that a finding that the police have the power to arrest for simple possession in cases like his would frustrate the purpose for which Parliament enacted the Good Samaritan Act. This, he argues, is because it would discourage people in similar situations from reaching out for medical and police assistance. Mr. Wilson is joined in the latter submission by the intervenor, John Howard Society of Saskatchewan.
 The purpose of s. 9, broadly stated, “is to protect individual liberty from unjustified state interference” (emphasis added, Grant at para 20, see also Le at para 152). A “lawful arrest or detention is not arbitrary, and does not infringe s. 9 of the Charter, unless the law authorizing the arrest or detention is itself arbitrary” (R v Tim, 2022 SCC 12 at para 22, 412 CCC (3d) 147, referencing Grant at para 54 and R v Mann, 2004 SCC 52 at para 20,  3 SCR 59). Conversely, “an unlawful arrest or detention is necessarily arbitrary and infringes s. 9 of the Charter” (Tim at para 22, referencing Grant at para 54 and R v Loewen, 2011 SCC 21 at para 3,  2 SCR 167).
 In keeping with this direction, if Mr. Wilson’s arrest for simple possession was unlawful, then there was a breach of his s. 9 Charter rights. As I have already noted, in that circumstance, there would also have been a breach of s. 8, because the search that led to the discovery of the backpack and its contents was incidental to his arrest. Summing up these points, the determination as to whether Mr. Wilson’s ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights were violated turns on the answer to the question of whether Mr. Wilson’s arrest for simple possession of a controlled substance was lawful.
 Prior to Mr.Wilson’s first arrest, he and his companions had been detained for investigative purposes. While on other facts it may be different, as I will later discuss, in the circumstances of this case, there could have been no purpose for Mr. Wilson’s first arrest made after that investigative detention other than for the purpose of charging him with simple possession. Yet, this is prohibited by the Good Samaritan Act; Mr. Wilson could not be charged with that offence at that point as all the evidence supporting such a charge had been “obtained or discovered as a result of [he and his companions] having sought [medical] assistance” for Ms. Delorme. From the moment of his first arrest and continuing through the time of the search of the truck, the discovery of the backpack and the search of its contents, the officers were in possession of no other evidence that would have justified charging him with simple possession. In the language of Grant and Le, the interference to Mr. Wilson’s liberty caused by his first arrest was unjustified.
 The Crown’s first suggestion is that s. 4.1(2) of the CDSA is not engaged on the facts of this case. In this regard, it says that, because Mr. Wilson was never charged, let alone convicted, of the offence of simple possession, s. 4.1(2) has no application at all. I am unpersuaded by this argument for the simple reason that the only purpose for Mr. Wilson’s arrest was to charge him with this offence – an action that was, based on the facts then known to the officers – prohibited by s. 4.1(2). I will expand on this conclusion later in these reasons.
 … I agree with the Crown that it was proper for the officers to understand that Mr. Wilson was found committing a crime. However, as I will next discuss, I cannot agree with the Crown’s further submission that this nonetheless justified his arrest under s. 495(1)(b) of the Code.
 The Crown’s reliance on s. 495(1)(b) ignores that all state powers, including powers that are given by statute, are bounded by the principle that they are to be exercised only for the purposes for which they are given. The most commonly cited authority for this proposition is Roncarelli v Duplessis,  SCR 121. While that case involved a challenge to a decision taken in bad faith, the principle it establishes is not so narrow. By way of example only, in R v Envirogun, 2023 SKCA 51, Richards C.J.S. noted that state powers “must be exercised in good faith and in ways that serve the purpose of the statute that confers authority” (emphasis added, at para 59). See also Brown v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FCA 130 at para 40, 448 DLR (4th) 714, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 2021 CanLII 18039; Nelles v Ontario,  2 SCR 170 at 209; R v Allain,  BCJ No 309 (QL) (Sup Ct) at paras 10–12; and R v Thomas, 2008 ONCJ 449 (WL) at para 16.
 In this case, as I have already mentioned, on the evidence, the only purpose for the first arrest of Mr. Wilson was to charge him under s. 4(1) of the CDSA. However, this was an action that Parliament has prohibited by s. 4.1(2), as the evidence in support of the arrest was all obtained or discovered because emergency assistance had been called for Ms. Delorme, and Mr. Wilson and his companions had stayed at the scene of her overdose.
 In oral argument, the Crown stated that the arrest of Mr. Wilson was justified because, otherwise, the police would have had no authority to have taken the drugs that were in plain view off of the streets. However, not only is there no evidence that this was the purpose for the first arrest, but it is also contradicted by the fact that, at the point of his first arrest, Mr. Wilson and his companions had already been identified and detained for investigative purposes and the drugs that were in plain sight had been seized.
 This seizure was lawful under s. 489(2) of the Code. Pursuant to that provision, an officer has the power to seize, without a warrant, anything that they believe, on reasonable grounds, (a) ”has been obtained by the commission of an offence”; (b) “has been used in the commission of an offence”; or (c) “will afford evidence in respect of an offence” under the Code or other Act of Parliament. One of the important implications of my earlier conclusion that s. 4.1(2) of the CDSA does not affect the fact that the officers had reasonable grounds to believe that the offence of possession had occurred is that s. 489(2) continued to apply. Therefore, the first arrest was not required to take the drugs off the streets.
 In oral argument, the Crown also suggested that the arrest might have been justified to prevent the continuation or repetition of the offence or the commission of another offence. It said that, if the police had not arrested Mr. Wilson, he could simply have demanded back the drugs that the police had seized and left the scene. Once again, there is no evidence to support this as the reason for the first arrest. In any event, I do not accept that Mr. Wilson could have demanded a return of the drugs, given the police power to seize them under s. 489(2) of the Code. In the latter regard, I agree with Mr. Wilson when he says that, if he had regained possession of the drugs, there would have been a different and completely legitimate reason for him to have been arrested. This reason would flow from the fact that he would then not have been in possession of the drugs because he had stayed at the scene. Accordingly, he would not have enjoyed the protection of s. 4.1(2) of the CDSA. Therefore, Mr. Wilson’s arrest for simple possession cannot be justified to prevent him from committing another crime.
 In short, the reasons that were given for why Mr. Wilson might have been arrested not only represent post facto justifications but are unpersuasive. As I have earlier stated, while on other facts it may be different, here, no reason existed for the first arrest of Mr. Wilson other than to have charged him with simple possession of a controlled substance. I would re-emphasize that Parliament has prohibited that very action on the facts of this case.
 I am left to conclude from all of this that Mr. Wilson’s first arrest was unlawful. It follows that his rights under both ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter were violated.
 I am fortified in this conclusion by Tim. It is a case that has many similarities to this one.
 The Supreme Court’s focus in Tim was on the question of whether an arrest based on a mistake of law is unlawful. Specifically, the Supreme Court asked, “Can a police officer arrest someone whom they believe has committed an offence, even if the facts relied on by the arresting officer, if true, do not involve unlawful conduct?” (at para 26). Justice Jamal, for the majority, expounded why the answer to that question was a resounding “No”, and therefore the arrest was contrary to s. 9 of the Charter:
 Compelling considerations of principle and legal policy confirm that a lawful arrest cannot be based on a mistake of law — that is, when the officer knows the facts and erroneously concludes that they amount to an offence, when, as a matter of law, they do not. Allowing the police to arrest someone based on what they believe the law is — rather than based on what the law actually is — would dramatically expand police powers at the expense of civil liberties. This would leave people at the mercy of what particular police officers happen to understand the law to be and would create disincentives for the police to know the law. Canadians rightly expect the police to follow the law, which requires the police to know the law. This Court has affirmed that “[w]hile police are not expected to engage in judicial reflection on conflicting precedents, they are rightly expected to know what the law is” (Grant, at para. 133; Le, at para. 149). Côté J. helpfully encapsulated the relevant considerations of principle and legal policy in Kosoian [2018 SCC 59], at para. 6:
In a free and democratic society, police officers may interfere with the exercise of individual freedoms only to the extent provided for by law. Every person can therefore legitimately expect that police officers who deal with him or her will comply with the law in force, which necessarily requires them to know the statutes, regulations and by-laws they are called upon to enforce. Police officers are thus obliged to have an adequate knowledge and understanding of the statutes, regulations and by-laws they have to enforce.
 Justice Jamal also addressed the Crown’s submission that the arrest was justified because possession of a controlled substance was an offence known at law:
 I do not accept this submission. The officer arrested the appellant for possession of gabapentin specifically. The officer knew the facts — he correctly identified the pill as gabapentin — but mistakenly concluded that possession of gabapentin was an offence, when, in law, it was not. That brings this case squarely within Frey [ SCR 517] and Kosoian. It makes no difference whether the mistake of law involves a non-existent offence, or an existing offence that could not be engaged on the facts, even if true, relied on by the officer. In both instances, the mistake of law precludes a lawful arrest. The courts below erred in concluding otherwise.
 The Crown seeks to distinguish Tim by pointing out that it involved a legal error by the officer as to whether the drugs the officer saw were proscribed under the CDSA. This distinction exists. However, I see this as less important than the key point I take from the case, which is that allowing the police to arrest someone based on what they believe the law is – rather than based on what the law actually is – would create an unjustified expansion of police powers at the expense of civil liberties. As I will later discuss, in this case, the evidence does not disclose whether the officers arrested Mr. Wilson and his companions for simple possession because they were unaware of s. 4.1(2) or because they misunderstood its legal effect. Either way, underpinning the arrest was a legal error on the part of the arresting officers.
 For all these reasons, in my respectful view, the trial judge erred in law when he concluded that Mr. Wilson’s ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights were not violated.
C. Admission of the evidence will bring the administration of justice into disrepute
2. The evidence was obtained in a manner that breached Mr. Wilson’s Charter rights
 Tim provides a helpful summary of the law as to when evidence has been obtained in a manner that has breached an accused’s Charter rights:
 This Court has provided guidance as to when evidence is “obtained in a manner” that breached an accused’s Charter rights so as to trigger s. 24(2):
- The courts take “a purposive and generous approach” to whether evidence was “obtained in a manner” that breached an accused’s Charter rights (R. v. Wittwer, 2008 SCC 33,  2 S.C.R. 235, at para. 21; R. v. Mack, 2014 SCC 58,  3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 38).
- The “entire chain of events” involving the Charter breach and the impugned evidence should be examined (R. v. Strachan,  2 S.C.R. 980, at pp. 1005–6).
- ”Evidence will be tainted if the breach and the discovery of the impugned evidence are part of the same transaction or course of conduct” (Mack, at para. 38; see also Wittwer, at para. 21).
- The connection between the Charter breach and the impugned evidence can be “temporal, contextual, causal or a combination of the three” (Wittwer, at para. 21, quoting R. v. Plaha (2004), 189 O.A.C. 376, at para. 45). A causal connection is not required (Wittwer, at para. 21; R. v. Mian, 2014 SCC 54,  2 S.C.R. 689, at para. 83; Strachan, at pp. 1000–1002).
- A remote or tenuous connection between the Charter breach and the impugned evidence will not suffice to trigger s. 24(2) (Mack, at para. 38; Wittwer, at para. 21; R. v. Goldhart,  2 S.C.R. 463, at para. 40; Strachan, at pp. 1005–6). Such situations should be dealt with on a case by case basis. There is “no hard and fast rule for determining when evidence obtained following the infringement of a Charter right becomes too remote” (Strachan, at p. 1006).
See also R. v. Pino, 2016 ONCA 389, 130 O.R. (3d) 561, at para. 72; R. v. Lichtenwald, 2020 SKCA 70, 388 C.C.C. (3d) 377, at para. 57; R. v. Reilly, 2020 BCCA 369, 397 C.C.C. (3d) 219, at paras. 75–76, aff’d 2021 SCC 38; and Hill, Tanovich and Strezos [(Rel 1, February 2022) McWilliams’ Canadian Criminal Evidence], at §19:22.
 Here, the connection between Mr. Wilson’s unlawful arrest and the discovery of the guns is direct and unbroken. Mr. Wilson’s later statement was also only obtained because of the discovery of the guns. In the circumstances of this case, at least, there is no room to conclude that any sort of fresh start would justify the admission of the confession: R v Beaver, 2022 SCC 54 at para 99, 475 DLR (4th) 575. Mr. Wilson’s statement, like the evidence of the guns, was, therefore, obtained in a manner that breached his Charter rights. While the Crown did not concede the point, it did not suggest otherwise.
3. The Grant analysis
a. Seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct
 Police officers who exercise the power of arrest can be expected to act with restraint and such careful assessment as the circumstances allow. Given that Mr. Wilson had been detained for investigative purposes, the officers had sufficient time to reflect on whether he could be charged with simple possession. There was only one answer to that question: Mr. Wilson could not be charged with that offence. With that answer in hand, the officers could then have asked themselves what purpose would be served by arresting him. As for that question, for the reasons I have already given, it should have been obvious to the officers that no lawful purpose would be served by Mr. Wilson’s arrest. Considering these two facts, it was not reasonable for the officers to have believed that they had the power to arrest Mr. Wilson.
 An evaluation of the seriousness of the state conduct here must also account for the purpose for which the Good Samaritan Act was passed. Much time was spent in argument about the relevance of parts of the Parliamentary debate as recorded in Hansard. However, I heard no dissent from the view expressed by LeBlanc J.A. in R v Aube, 2022 NBCA 65, when he described “the objective sought by Parliament with this enactment” to be “to remove a barrier to medical help being given to a person experiencing an overdose, and to protect those assisting that person, without fear of being prosecuted for either simple possession or using drugs at the same time” (at para 66). I accept Mr. Wilson’s submission that, whatever their motivation, the officers’ actions in this case ran contrary to this stated objective. The reasons why finding that the police are entitled to arrest a person who stays at an overdose scene for simple possession would be contrary to the purpose of the Good Samaritan Act are obvious. Simply put, if drug users witnessing an overdose do not know or trust that the Good Samaritan Act will protect them from arrest, their fear of consequences for simple possession will reduce their likelihood of calling 911.
 For all these reasons, I cannot accept the Crown’s characterization of the state misconduct as being minor. On the evidence in this case, it is best described as being moderately serious.
b. Impact on Mr. Wilson’s Charter-protected interests
 The latter point leads to the important fact that Mr. Wilson’s privacy rights were violated because of his arbitrary arrest and the unlawful search that was conducted incidental to it. In saying this, I accept that Mr. Wilson had no privacy rights in connection with the truck. However, he did in relation to his backpack. It also cannot be said with confidence that the evidence would have been discovered but for the breach of Mr. Wilson’s rights. As noted in Grant, “in cases where it cannot be determined with any confidence whether evidence would have been discovered in absence of the statement, discoverability will have no impact on the s. 24(2) inquiry” (at para 122). See also Tim at para 94.
 Considering all of this, I would evaluate the impact of the breach of Mr. Wilson’s rights as being, at the very least, moderately intrusive. Thus, the weight of the second Grant line of inquiry pulls toward the exclusion of the evidence.
 Bringing all of this together, I am satisfied that society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on the merits weighs heavily in favour of the admission of the impugned evidence. Mr. Wilson conceded as much.
d. Final balancing
 In this case, what the Court is faced with are moderately serious Charter breaches, which caused a moderate intrusion on Mr. Wilson’s Charter-protected interests. These must be weighed against a serious impact on the Court’s adjudicative role if the impugned evidence is excluded. This presents a difficult balance. However, ultimately, it must come down against the admission of the evidence. I say this for four reasons.
 First, although the crimes for which Mr. Wilson has been convicted are very serious, no part of them would have been known had his rights been respected. This is not a situation where the breach of his rights simply added evidence to the case against him.
 Second, there was nothing urgent in the circumstances. Mr. Wilson and his companions were already detained for an investigation. The drugs that were in plain view had been lawfully seized. The area was secure. In short, the officers were in a position to act in a careful manner that respected Mr. Wilson’s rights. Yet there is no basis to conclude that they did so. If they had questions about whether Mr. Wilson could be charged with simple possession, they had the time to secure their answer.
 Third, although Omar must be read as attaching weight to society’s interest in curbing the prevalence of drugs and guns in our communities, the decision recognizes that the admission of evidence in the face of a breach of an accused’s Charter rights will not be allowed in a case simply because the crime involves drugs or guns. In this regard, in Omar-CA, both the majority and the dissent in the Court of Appeal agreed that “there is no ‘firearms exception’ requiring that guns obtained in breach of Charter rights be admitted into evidence” (at para 56 per Sharpe J.A. and at para 122 per Brown J.A). See also Lichtenwald at para 80. Also, although in Omar-CA the Court of Appeal determined that the ultimate balance came down in favour the admission of the evidence, the facts there were different. The handgun in that case was loaded and was being carried by Mr. Omar. The trial judge determined, on the evidence, that the police had acted in good faith and did not believe that they had even detained the accused. The detention itself was also much more fleeting. The gun was seen in plain view by one of the officers when the offender removed his hand from his pocket. The first fact made the offending conduct even more serious than Mr. Wilson’s. The remaining facts rendered the nature of the Charter breaches to be less serious than in this case. Finally, the admission of the evidence in Omar did not implicate the protections intended to be afforded pursuant to the Good Samaritan Act. I turn now to that decisive consideration.
 The fourth and most significant reason why I am persuaded that the balance favours the exclusion of the evidence in this case is because the admission of it would undermine Parliament’s purposes for passing the Good Samaritan Act.
 On the facts here, it is likely that Ms. Delorme is alive only because one of her companions called 911. In her case, the objective of the Good Samaritan Act was achieved. However, if drug users witnessing an overdose or other medical emergency do not know or trust that the Good Samaritan Act will protect them, their fear of consequences for simple possession will reduce the likelihood of them calling 911. In future cases, people in the very same position as Ms. Delorme may well not survive if the evidence in this case is admitted…
e. Conclusion on the admission of the evidence
 Considering all of this, I am satisfied that the final balance of all factors in the circumstances of this case comes down in favour of excluding the evidence that was obtained in a manner that breached Mr. Wilson’s Charter rights.
 The trial judge erred in law when he concluded that Mr. Wilson’s ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights had not been violated. The admission of the evidence gathered, because of the breach of these rights, would, in the circumstances of this case, bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Without this evidence, Mr. Wilson’s conviction cannot stand, and, therefore, an acquittal on all charges must be entered.