A caregiver created pornographic images and videos of a seven-year-old child in her care. Police learned that she had been sharing images and videos with several individuals, including with someone using an IP address that was linked to the appellant, John O’Brien’s, home. On February 28, 2019, police obtained a warrant to search Mr. O’Brien’s home for electronic devices and related items, including notes of device passwords The execution of that warrant yielded evidence that led to Mr. O’Brien being charged with accessing child pornography over the previous eleven-month period.
 At his trial Mr. O’Brien applied to have the evidence secured during the execution of the search warrant excluded because of alleged breaches of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The trial judge found that the manner in which the search was executed contravened s. 8 of the Charter, and that during the search the police also breached ss. 9 and 10(b) of the Charter. The trial judge excluded evidence extracted from Mr. O’Brien’s iPhone after the trial Crown conceded its exclusion but held that the admission of the evidence secured from a Dell computer located in the house, as well as a seized USB thumb drive and photographs taken in the basement of the home would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
 On the strength of the admitted evidence, Mr. O’Brien was convicted of accessing child pornography contrary to s. 163.1(4.1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46.
 Mr. O’Brien appeals his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in her s. 24(2) decision by admitting the evidence that she did, thereby requiring a new trial. He also seeks leave to appeal the two s. 161 orders I have just described.
 For the reasons that follow, I agree that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence seized from the Dell computer. I would therefore allow Mr. O’Brien’s conviction appeal and order a new trial. Given this outcome it is unnecessary for me to comment on the sentence appeal. I will say no more about it.
 On February 28, 2019, at approximately 9:00 a.m., Mr. O’Brien and his wife, Kathryn King, were awakened by banging on the door of their home, where they were sleeping. When Mr. O’Brien robed and answered the door, three police officers were present. They identified themselves, showed him the search warrant, which included the authority to search and seize electronic devices, and entered the house.
 … The police officers had incomplete notes with “disappointing” gaps on several points, and although the trial judge found Mr. O’Brien and Ms. King to be credible witnesses, she found that they may not be entirely reliable because they were somewhat overwhelmed by events….
 For their part, Mr. O’Brien and Ms. King described a highly intrusive police entry, with Ms. King in bed wearing only a tank top when the officers entered, yelling commands, directing Mr. O’Brien and Ms. King’s movements, separating them, and not telling them they were free to leave or that they did not require permission to undertake acts such as making coffee or going to the bathroom. They testified that almost immediately upon entry, the officers demanded the passwords to their personal electronic devices – in Mr. O’Brien’s case to his iPhone and Dell computer, and in Ms. King’s case to her iPhone. Mr. O’Brien and Ms. King testified that they provided the passwords, believing they were compelled to do so. With respect to the Dell computer that was kept in the basement, Mr. O’Brien testified that he followed an officer down to the computer and wrote the password down on a piece of paper.
 The officers denied separating Mr. O’Brien and Ms. King. D.C. Rieder testified that she advised Mr. O’Brien and Ms. King that they were free to leave. None of the officers had any recollection of asking for the passwords to the Dell computer, but D.C. Rieder testified that she asked Mr. O’Brien for the password to his iPhone after entering the home. She also believed that she obtained the password for Ms. King’s phone.
 D.C. Dunnill, the forensic computer examiner who was present during the search, confirmed that he accessed and previewed Mr. O’Brien’s iPhone with a password provided by another officer. He testified that upon executing search warrants for electronic devices, police routinely ask for passwords without explaining that it is unnecessary to comply, and without explaining what the consequences of compliance would be.
 D.C. Hagstrom testified that he gained access to the Dell computer using a password he found written on a piece of paper that was in front of the Dell computer.
The Section 8 Violation
 Based on the evidence before her, the trial judge found that the manner in which the police conducted the search violated s. 8 of the Charter. Specifically, she found that the police contravened s. 8 of the Charter by asking Mr. O’Brien and Ms. King for passwords to their electronic devices during the execution of the search warrant, without seeking their informed consent….
…She found, based on the evidence, that this was routine behaviour, and commented, “I am very concerned about the apparent cavalier attitude towards obtaining passwords, by asking for them without explaining the basics of valid consent.” She commented at the end of her decision, “This is a serious matter which needs to be addressed by the police service.”
 Although she did not say so expressly, it is clear from her decision that the trial judge accepted the evidence before her that without the password to Mr. O’Brien’s iPhone it would have been very difficult to access its contents…
The Sections 9 and 10(b) Violations
 …As a result, she found that Mr. O’Brien “[was] not aware of [his] rights and options, including the right to leave, [his] level of freedom within the house, and the right to call counsel for advice”, and that even though the police had not separated Mr. O’Brien and Ms. King or told them that they must ask permission to do things, they reasonably believed that they were being separated and needed such permission. The trial judge commented, “I find it is not necessary to determine a specific starting point [for the detention], but this conversation [advising them of their rights] should have taken place early in the search process.” She therefore concluded that “both sections 9 and 10(b) were infringed.”
 …The trial judge did not explain her application of the three Grant factors to the search of Mr. O’Brien’s iPhone, after accepting the trial Crown’s concession that the contents of that search required exclusion, pursuant to s. 24(2). She did explain her application of the three Grant factors to the balance of the evidence and found that its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute. It is convenient to describe her material reasoning in this regard while analyzing the grounds of appeal.
THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE S. 8 VIOLATION
 I will note at the outset that the Crown argued on appeal that the request by the police for the passwords to the electronic devices was not a breach of s. 8. Rather, the appeal Crown conceded that a serious s. 10(b) violation occurred when the police asked for the passwords before Mr. O’Brien had a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel. Given the trial judge’s detention finding, which was not challenged on appeal, I accept the Crown’s concession that s. 10(b) was violated and that this violation was serious. A similar violation occurred in R. v. Boutros, 2018 ONCA 375, 361 C.C.C. (3d) 240 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 11. However, I do not agree that no s. 8 violation occurred.
 ….It is trite law that an otherwise lawful search can become unreasonable because it was executed unreasonably: R. v. Collins,  1 S.C.R. 265, at p. 278. It is important to recognize, in my view, that the execution of a search warrant creates an inherently coercive atmosphere. Officers are empowered by law to enter a place, in this case a dwelling house, and to take control of the occupants to facilitate the search. It was while making commands under the authority of the search warrant, in this coercive atmosphere, and almost immediately upon entering the dwelling house, that police officers began to ask the occupants for their passwords, knowing that the occupants were not lawfully required to furnish them. In these circumstances, I agree with the trial judge, and with the apparent concession of the trial Crown, that the manner in which this search was conducted contravened s. 8 of the Charter.
 I also agree that the trial judge erred in assessing the seriousness of this breach. I do not accept the Crown’s submission that she simply gave less weight to the seriousness of the breach than others may have done, as she was entitled to do. As Mr. O’Brien argues, the trial judge erred by failing to consider her own findings about the systemic nature of the s. 8 breach when assessing its seriousness. I will elaborate.
 …In R. v. Tim, 2022 SCC 12, 412 C.C.C. (3d) 147, at para. 82, Jamal J. explained that there is a spectrum or scale of police misconduct. The more serious the offending conduct, the more pressing the need for the court to dissociate itself from the fruits of that conduct.
 It is also settled law that the seriousness of the breach is aggravated where there is a systemic problem or pattern of Charter-infringing conduct: R. v. Thompson, 2020 ONCA 264, 62 C.R. (7th) 286 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 85, citing Grant, at para. 75; R. v. Harrison, 2009 SCC 34,  2 S.C.R. 494, at para. 25. This follows from the prospective role that the exclusionary rule is to play, in which “the judge’s analysis must focus on systemic concerns”: Grant, at para. 201.
 …As I have indicated, the trial judge found that the officers involved in the search understood the heightened expectation of privacy in electronic devices and in passwords for such devices, yet routinely asked for passwords while acting under the compulsory authority of search warrants, without concern for the validity of the consent they were seeking. Not surprisingly, given this finding, the trial judge expressed concern about the “apparent cavalier attitude” of the police in obtaining passwords and noted that this “is a serious matter which needs to be addressed by the police service.”
 Yet, without mentioning these findings when assessing the seriousness of the police conduct, she concluded that “[t]he section 8 breach in relation to the Dell was ... minimal.” Her finding that the breach was minimal is entirely incompatible with her characterization of the offending police conduct as systemic…
 The appeal Crown sought to defend the trial judge’s characterization of the seriousness of the s. 8 breach as minimal by noting that the police did not need the password to access the Dell computer, thereby reducing the seriousness of the privacy breach. Even if this was her thinking, it was in error. The fact that evidence was discoverable without a breach is relevant and potentially important to the second Grant factor – the impact of the breach on the Charter-protected interests of the accused – but has nothing to do with the seriousness of the police misconduct. The seriousness of the breach is an evaluation of the mode that was used for the purpose of acquiring the evidence, a consideration entirely unaffected by the availability of alternative modes of discovering the evidence. Moreover, it is illogical to think that discoverability in the instant case somehow lessens the seriousness of a systemic course of Charter violations over multiple cases.
 I am therefore satisfied that the trial judge erred in principle in evaluating the seriousness of the breaches without considering the systemic nature of the violations, and by finding that the breach relating to the Dell computer was of minimal seriousness.
SHOULD THE BALANCE OF THE EVIDENCE BE EXCLUDED?
 Given that the trial judge erred in legal principle in her s. 24(2) analysis, I must undertake the s. 24(2) analysis afresh….
…the trial Crown consented to the exclusion of the contents of Mr. O’Brien’s iPhone at trial, and the appeal Crown has not asked for reconsideration of that determination. I will therefore refrain from commenting on how the Grant factors bear on the admission of the contents of Mr. O’Brien’s iPhone and will confine my comments on the effects of each factor on the admission of evidence that is at issue on this appeal, namely the contents of the Dell computer, the USB thumb drive, and the photographs taken during the search of the basement area of Mr. O’Brien’s home.
 For the following reasons, I would exclude the evidence extracted from the Dell computer but would not exclude the USB thumb drive. Nor would I exclude the photographs of the basement the police took during the search.
The Seriousness of the Breaches
 In my view, on the factual findings made by the trial judge, the s. 8 Charter breaches that occurred when Mr. O’Brien was asked to provide the passwords to his electronic devices were at the most serious end of the spectrum. Those breaches can only be described as wilful, given the trial judge’s finding that the police, aware of the heightened expectation of privacy that Mr. O’Brien had in his electronic devices, decided to seek the passwords without concern for obtaining his valid consent and despite knowing what valid consent entails. These “cavalier” and deliberate s. 8 violations were significantly aggravated by their systemic character. The trial judge found that this was routine behaviour and recognized that it is a serious matter that needs to be addressed.
 I accept the trial judge’s conclusion that the s. 9 breach was of minimal seriousness. There is no basis on the evidence for inferring that the police intentionally set out to detain Mr. O’Brien or acted negligently in doing so….
 I cannot share the trial judge’s conclusion that the s. 10(b) breach was of minimal seriousness. As the appeal Crown conceded before us, not only did the police not advise Mr. O’Brien of his right to counsel but they used him as a source of self-incriminating evidence before he had a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel, a breach the appeal Crown recognizes to be serious.
 Moreover, the ss. 9 and 10(b) breaches, along with the s. 8 breaches, were part of a larger pattern of Charter violations, which enhances the case for exclusion: R. v. Chaisson, 2006 SCC 11,  1 S.C.R. 415; R. v. Cote, 2011 SCC 46,  3 S.C.R. 215, at para. 81.
The Impact of the Breaches
 The impact of the s. 8 Charter breach relating to the search of the iPhone was considerable. In R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8,  1 S.C.R. 253, at para. 2, Fish J. commented that “[i]t is difficult to imagine a search more intrusive, extensive, or invasive of one’s privacy than the search of a personal computer” given the broad spectrum of personal information that personal computing devices, including cellphones, contain. The police had a lawful warrant to seize the iPhones, but on the evidence before the trial judge, they effectively required the password to Mr. O’Brien’s iPhone to access its contents. The s. 8 breach in securing the password to Mr. O’Brien’s iPhone therefore had a significant impact on his Charter-protected interests.
 In contrast, the s. 8 breach relating to the Dell computer had little impact on Mr. O’Brien’s Charter-protected interests. The discoverability doctrine, relied upon by the Crown, is not needed to blunt the impact of the s. 8 breach relating to the Dell computer password because of the trial judge’s finding that the password provided by Mr. O’Brien in response to police requests was, in fact, not used to gain access to its contents. Moreover, the police had a valid warrant to view the contents. Apart from the privacy interests inherent in the password itself, the s. 8 violation had no impact on Mr. O’Brien’s Charter-protected interests relating to the Dell computer.
 Similarly, the s. 8 violations had no discernible impact on Mr. O’Brien’s privacy interest in the USB thumb drive, which was not password protected,…
 The trial judge found the impact of the s. 9 violation on Mr. O’Brien’s Charter-protected interests was lessened because the police were firm but not verbally or physically abusive or threatening. I agree. The duration of the unconstitutional detention was also brief and occurred within the relative comfort of Mr. O’Brien’s home, as opposed to a police vehicle or cell.
 In contrast, the s. 10(b) breach was impactful. Not only was Mr. O’Brien not advised of, or provided with, the right to counsel when detained, the police conscripted him as a source of information that could be used against him in his own investigation, without first providing him a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel.
 First, even where apparent legal options may be limited, such as where breath demands have been made in alcohol-driving cases that must be complied with, this does not lessen the impact of a s. 10(b) breach. Neither the right to consult counsel or its importance is contingent on the prospect that the advice will have a significant impact in ameliorating the legal peril the accused is facing. In any event, Mr. O’Brien provided his passwords because he felt compelled to do so. Had he received legal advice he may have discovered that he was not required to furnish them.
 In addition, the right to counsel serves a range of interests that go beyond the receipt of substantive legal advice, including providing a “lifeline to the outside world” (R. v. Pino, 2016 ONCA 389, 130 O.R. (3d) 561 (C.A.), at para. 105), educating the subject about the “procedures brought to bear”, such as bail release, and ensuring that the subject is not entirely at the mercy of the police while detained” (R. v. Rover, 2018 ONCA 745, 143 O.R. (3d) 135 (C.A.), at para. 45). Mr. O’Brien did not enjoy these benefits because of the s. 10(b) breach.
 The primary impact of the s. 10(b) breach, however, arises from the fact that Mr. O’Brien was conscripted to assist in the investigation against him by providing his passwords, without having had a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel. As I have explained, the police wanted the password as a means of gaining access to incriminating information. By asking Mr. O’Brien to provide that password they were seeking self-incriminating information from him. The indignity of being conscripted to assist in one’s own incrimination in this way, in violation of s. 10(b) of the Charter, is not an insignificant deprivation of Mr. O’Brien’s Charter-protected interests, even in the absence of a causal connection between that breach and the evidence sought to be admitted.
 In all of the circumstances, the impact of the s. 10(b) breach was moderate, arguably even serious.
 In these circumstances it is my view that the third Grant factor – society’s interest in the adjudication of the case – favours admissibility of the contents of the Dell computer, but not heavily so, provided the USB thumb drive and photos are not excluded. In contrast, exclusion of all of this evidence would gut the Crown’s case and damage the repute of the administration of justice.
 After balancing the three Grant factors in all the circumstances I am persuaded that the admission of the contents of the Dell computer would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and must be excluded.
 I would exclude the Dell computer from evidence primarily because of the seriousness of the ss. 8 and 10(b) violations relating to the conscription of Mr. O’Brien to provide his passwords. As the majority reaffirmed in Lafrance at para. 90, “while the first two [Grant] lines of inquiry typically work in tandem it is not necessary that both of them support exclusion in order for a court to determine that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute”. The seriousness of the violations makes exclusion of the Dell computer appropriate, even though I have made more modest findings relating to the impact of the breaches on Mr. O’Brien’s Charter-protected interests.
 As indicated, I do not arrive at the same outcome with respect to the USB thumb drive and the photographs. The ss. 8 and 10(b) Charter violations that occurred when the police secured Mr. O’Brien’s passwords related to the investigation of the electronic devices, not this evidence. In my view, this reduces the need to exclude this evidence, notwithstanding the seriousness of the s. 8 and s. 10(b) violations, and the impact of the breaches. It is well established what even where there is a temporal and contextual link between breaches and the discovery of evidence, the absence of a causal connection is a factor that may reduce the need to exclude evidence: Strachan, at para. 47; Keshavarz, at paras. 112-16; Desilva, at paras. 87, 97. I find that it does so in the circumstances of this case. The exclusion of the contents of the Dell computer, which have a more compelling contextual link to the breaches, will adequately signal that the Charter breaches cannot be condoned and that Charter rights matter.
 I would allow Mr. O’Brien’s appeal since the trial judge erred in principle in her s. 24(2) decision. Considering the s. 24(2) issue anew, I would exclude the contents of the Dell computer but not the USB thumb drive and photographs. I would therefore set aside the conviction and order a new trial at which the contents of the Dell computer would not be admissible.