This week’s top three summaries: R v Myers, 2022 NSCA 69: #inventory searches, R v DD, 2022 ONCA 786: #historical sex assault, and R v Fisher, 2022 ABPC 232: waiver of in default #jail
This week's top case deals with a drug prosecution issue. For great general reference on drug prosecutions, I recommend the Emond title below. It is available for purchase now for our readership with a 10% discount code provided below. To purchase, simply click on image below.
R v Myers, 2022 NSCA 69
[November 16, 2022] Charter s.8: Inventory Search - [Reasons by Bourgeois J.A. with Bryson and Beaton JJ.A. concurring]
AUTHOR’S NOTE: This case deals with the tricky issue of inventory searches of vehicles being towed from a scene. Helpfully for the defence, the case sets out a bright line rule for what police should do if there are moveable personal items left in the vehicle before they start searching them. A reasonable inventory search does not extent to personal property of occupants that will not remain in the vehicle when taken into police custody. Occupants should be given the opportunity to remove their personal belongings from the vehicle prior to it being placed under police control. Police have to explain why such items which could have been taken, were rained or searched. For example in this case, a backpack could not reasonably be searched pursuant to an inventory search.
Reasons For Judgment:
[2] Given the truck was not insured, the officer called for it to be towed to a third-party lot and commenced “an inventory search” of the contents of the vehicle. While detaining both the driver and the appellant, the officer began the inventory search by opening a backpack located on the floor on the passenger side of the truck. Various prohibited drugs and drug paraphernalia were located in the backpack. The appellant was arrested, provided a statement to the police, and was subsequently charged with two counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19 (the “CDSA”).
[3] At trial, the appellant argued the inventory search was not reasonable in the circumstances and constituted a violation of his rights under s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. He submitted the evidence resulting therefrom, namely the drugs and a statement given to police following his arrest, ought to be excluded as evidence, and an acquittal entered.
Decision Under Appeal:
[8] Sgt. Rose testified that he was on patrol in Truro in a marked cruiser on Dec. 23, 2018. He testified that:
- The purpose of the inventory search is for officer liability reasons as the police do not want to be blamed, or held liable, for items that allegedly disappear from a vehicle once it has been towed away. The inventory search is also to conduct a cursory search to ensure that there are no weapons or other hazards in the vehicle before it is towed away
[21] I accept that the law as noted in Cooper applies equally to Nova Scotia, and in particular that where authority is granted to the police pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Act, or other authorizing legislation, to take possession of a vehicle and store it in a safe place, it is implicit in the legislation that the police have the duty and responsibility when exercising that authority to ensure the safety of the vehicle and its contents and conduct an inventory search to that end, and, in order to properly fulfil their lawful duty and responsibility to secure the property, entitled to conduct an inventory of the vehicle’s contents. The police must be able to take reasonable steps to meet their duty to safeguard the property, including entering the vehicle and itemizing any property of apparent value therein.(Bold and underline in original)
[34] I find that the search of the backpack belonging to Mr. Myers was as a result of a legal inventory search and that it is admissible as evidence in this trial. There was no breach of Mr. Myers’ s. 8 Charter rights.[35] Consequently, the voluntary statement by Mr. Myers to the police acknowledging that he was possessing the drugs for the purpose of trafficking is also admissible. As is the expert report, and testimony, of Cpl. Lane that are as a result of the discovery of the backpack contents by Sgt. Rose.
Seizure of vehicle involved in offence
273 (1) The Registrar, any official of the Department or any peace officer may seize a motor vehicle with which an offence has been committed under this Act or under any section of the Criminal Code (Canada) having particular relation to motor vehicles and may detain the same until the final disposition of any prosecution instituted for such offence but such motor vehicle may be released on such security for its production being furnished as the Registrar may require.
28 Under s. 221(1) of the H.T.A., the police are authorized to do the following:
-- take the vehicle into the custody of the law; -- cause it to be taken to a place of storage; and -- store the vehicle in a suitable place.
29 Custody is defined in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary as "safekeeping, protection, charge, care, guardianship." Taking a vehicle into "the custody of the law" entails more than simply assuming possession and control of the vehicle. It involves the preservation and safekeeping of the vehicle while in the care and control of the police. Nor do I draw any distinction between the vehicle and its contents when the vehicle is impounded. Both are equally in the "custody of the law."
30 With the responsibility to keep the impounded property safe, must come the ability to take reasonable steps to achieve that end. Entering the vehicle for the purpose of itemizing visible property of apparent value is entirely in keeping with the responsibility to safeguard the vehicle and its contents while they are in the custody of the law. . .
(Emphasis added)
[25] The appellant says the search exceeded the parameters of an inventory search, and was therefore unreasonable. In short, the appellant should have been given his backpack and sent on his way, before the inventory of the truck contents began. There was no justifiable reason for the backpack to be part of an inventory search of the vehicle contents. The Crown says the trial judge was correct in concluding a search of the backpack was reasonable.
And further:
[36] The purpose of the inventory search is to allow the officer an opportunity to identify and record property which the police are retaining control of as a result of taking control of the vehicle. Once the police decide to take control of a vehicle, the driver or owner is not immediately foreclosed from taking possession of property contained in the vehicle which he or she wishes to retain. It is reasonable that a driver or owner will be given an opportunity to retain items in the vehicle at the time of the impoundment assuming that in doing so they do not interfere in the execution of the officer's duties. The objective of most if not all vehicle impoundment legislation, and s. 188(1)(d) of the Motor Vehicle Act is no exception, is to remove the vehicle from public roadways. The objective is not to impound the contents of the vehicle.[37] ...I do not believe it would be wise or appropriate to expect the officer to perform a complete search of an individual's wallet in such cases.
(Emphasis added)
- Courts must exercise vigilance in assessing whether an inventory search was conducted reasonably. The power of police to search the contents of a vehicle under the detention power contained in the MVA is one fraught with the risk of purposeful or inadvertent misapplication. Police must be vigilant that the manner in which an inventory search is conducted does not go beyond its purpose;
- Given its purpose, a reasonable inventory search does not extend to personal property of occupants that will not remain in the vehicle when taken into police custody;
- Occupants should be given the opportunity to remove their personal belongings from the vehicle prior to it being placed under police control, unless doing so would interfere with the investigation being conducted; [PJM Emphasis]
- As the Crown has the burden of establishing the inventory search was conducted reasonably, police should explain why personal belongings which could have been taken by occupants were retained and/or searched; and
- As per Wint, if personal belongings such as a purse, backpack or bag remain in the vehicle after it is placed in police control, it is reasonable, as part of an inventory search, to document the contents thereof. It is important to recognize the opening of a purse (or bag) in one situation may be found to be part of a reasonable inventory search, whereas the context in another case may lead to the conclusion such action is unreasonable.
[31] The trial judge concluded that an inventory search was appropriate in the circumstances. I agree with his conclusion. However, in assessing whether the search was conducted in a reasonable manner, he failed to consider if all of the contents needed to be inventoried.
Issue 3: Should this Court undertake a fresh s. 24(2) analysis, and if so, what is the result?
- Although courts have determined there is a decreased expectation of privacy in the contents of vehicles; here, the inculpatory evidence was found in a closed backpack located on the floor by the passenger seat. The appellant had been sitting in that seat when the truck was stopped by Sgt. Rose. In his cross-examination, he acknowledged he did not ask either the driver or the appellant permission before opening the bag and starting a search. Unlike visible contents of the vehicle, a passenger would have an expectation of privacy in regard to a closed backpack. In my view, although Sgt. Rose was justified in undertaking an inventory search, his search of the backpack showed a unwarranted disregard to his obligation to undertake the search in a reasonable fashion and in accordance with the law;
-
Unjustified searches of the personal belongings of the travelling public should not be condoned by this Court. In viewing the search of the appellant’s backpack as behaviour this Court should disassociate itself from, I call to mind the words of Justice Binnie in R. v. A.M., 2008 SCC 19:
[62] The backpacks from which the odour emanated here belonged to various members of the student body including the accused. As with briefcases, purses and suitcases, backpacks are the repository of much that is personal, particularly for people who lead itinerant lifestyles during the day as in the case of students and travellers. No doubt ordinary businessmen and businesswomen riding along on public transit or going up and down on elevators in office towers would be outraged at any suggestion that the contents of their briefcases could randomly be inspected by the police without "reasonable suspicion" of illegality. Because of their role in the lives of students, backpacks objectively command a measure of privacy.
The impact on the Charter-protected interests of the appellant
Disposition
[59] Without the impugned evidence, there was no reasonable prospect of conviction. As such, I would set aside the two convictions under s. 5(2) of the CDSA, and enter acquittals on both charges.
R v DD, 2022 ONCA 786
[November 17, 2022] Historical Sexual Assault: Evaluation of the Evidence of an Adult (Age 18) Giving Evidence about Events Alleged from Ages 5-11. [Doherty, Alexandra Hoy, David M. Paciocco JJ.A.]
AUTHOR’S NOTE: The temptation to ease the credibility testing of complainants of historical sexual assault can sometimes be overwhelming to triers of fact. One thing they cannot do is treat the testimony of adults about events that occurred when they were children a break on the basis that a child would not have the intelligence or experience to concoct the details of such an event. The person testifying is an adult - the are not to be treated as a child witness.
Reasons For Decision
[3] D.D. appeals this conviction and the accompanying finding that he was guilty of sexual assault, an overlapping charge that was stayed to avoid double jeopardy. We allow his appeal. The trial judge erred by assessing the complainant’s credibility as if she were a child at the time that she testified.
[4] In R. v. W. (R.), [1992] 2 S.C.R. 122, it was affirmed that the evidence of children must be approached on a common sense basis bearing in mind their mental development, understanding and ability to communicate. “Since children may experience the world differently from adults, it is hardly surprising that details important to adults, like time and place, may be missing from their recollection”: R. v. W. (R)., at para. 25. By way of illustration, the inability of the child complainant in R. v. W. (R.) to accurately describe the location of bedrooms in a house, a peripheral matter, was not significant to her credibility or reliability, since a child may not attend to such details: R. v. W. (R.), at para. 30.
[5] Even when adults testify about events that allegedly occurred when they were children, such considerations remain relevant. This is logical. If a witness would not likely have noted the thing as a child, their failure to relate that thing years later while testifying as an adult cannot meaningfully unsettle the credibility or reliability of their evidence. Therefore, “the presence of inconsistencies, particularly as to peripheral matters such as time and location, should be considered in the context of the age of the witness at the time of the events to which she is testifying” (emphasis added): R. v. W. (R.), at para. 27.
No doubt, from this court’s review of the evidence, it is obvious that the court is touched by the logic of [the complainant’s] evidence. Her evidence has the quality of a child bearing witness to a progressive sexual abuse by herself [sic]. There are plenty of childlike details such as taste, the sound of photographs; [sic] the sound of the zipper, the yellow couch, and the concrete floor and the puddles of semen on the floor, which are so compelling, there is no reasonable doubt as to what she attests to. [Emphasis added.]
(1) The complainant testified that D.D. asked her to slowly undress. The trial judge found this compelling because “these assertions do not present as a fantasy in a child’s world, but as child relating a memory of a strange thing of an adult doing”. The problem of course is that the complainant was not a child when relating these assertions. She was a mature witness.
(2)The complainant testified that she was blind-folded and sat on a toilet during sexual assaults. The trial judge said, “[t]his is a scene so far removed from the natural events of a child it has a certain stand out quality.” Once again, this event was not being related by a child who may have difficulty conjuring such a scenario. It was related by a mature witness.
(3)The complainant testified that D.D. would take photographs. The trial judge said, “it just seems so out of sync with a child’s story unless it was a detail that the child remembered.” With respect, the judge was not hearing a child’s story.
R v Fisher, 2022 ABPC 232
[November 17, 2022] Time in Default on Provincial Offence [Judge R.C. Shaigee]
AUTHOR’S NOTE: Debtors prison has been a very real thing in Alberta for far longer than in other jurisdictions. As debtors prisons have been known to do, they tend to punish those most unable to meet their financial obligations due to overwhelming life circumstances. Here, Judge Shaigee took time to write some reasons after disposing of such a case in a busy docket courtroom. The decision is a breath of fresh air. People should not be imprisoned because simply because they cannot pay due to drug addiction or homelessness.
Introduction
[2] One morning last spring police found Mr. Fisher asleep in the back of his uninsured van, parked on a rural road outside of Entwistle. He has now pleaded guilty to having an uninsured vehicle on a highway, contrary to s. 54(1) of the Traffic Safety Act, RSA 2000, c T-6 (TSA).
Victim Surcharge
Days in Default - "Public Interest"
In proceedings commenced ... under Part 2, a justice sentencing a defendant ... shall consider the ability of the defendant to pay a fine ... and notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in any other enactment, may refuse to impose a period of imprisonment in default of payment of the fine ... where imprisonment would not serve the public interest.
[12] Adopting the public’s perspective, I am mindful of the following. Individuals like Robert Fisher who live in “serious poverty ... appear with staggering regularity in our provincial courts”: Boudreault at paras 54-55. Further, jail is a last resort sentence in our law. And our law has long held that jail is not the default position in relation to the non-payment of provincial offence fines. To the opposite, s. 13(1) POPA (which provides for civil recovery) ought to be the government’s primary means of enforcing payment: R v Goebel, 2003 ABQB 422 at paras 72-78 per Slatter J (as he then was). Finally, reasonable members of our community would not endorse an interpretation of law that results in the disproportionate imprisonment of indigent Albertans. [PJM Emphasis]