This week’s top three summaries: R v Merrit, 2023 ONCA 3: #partial stmt and #after the fact, R v Kehoe, 2023 BCCA 2: Gladue #disconnection, and R v Strongeagle, 2023 ABCA 5: #circumstantial ID.
This week's top case deals with statement admissibility and weight issues. For great general reference on the law of evidence, I recommend the Emond title below. It is available for purchase now for our readership with a 10% discount code provided below. To purchase, simply click on image below.
R v Merritt, 2023 ONCA 3
[January 5, 2023] Admissibility of Partial Statements - After the Fact Conduct Instructions re Omission in Police Statement [Reasons by Paciocco J.A. with J.C. MacPherson and J.A. Thorburn JJ.A. concurring]
AUTHOR’S NOTE: The case against Ms. Merritt on this matter was weak. The Crown depended on both an omission about her partner's attendance at a Walmart to buy shoes (connected to the homicide) and a poor quality recorded statement while they were strategically placed together post-arrest at an airport to await a flight. The trial judge's instruction about the omission raised the prospect that he required the accused to establish through evidence that her omission was not culpable. The error was that the probative value of such evidence can be undermined by mere lack of evidence leading to reasonable doubt (ie. she was covering for her partner, or didn't want to get into trouble for accessory after the fact, not murder). On the Partial Statement front, the Court of Appeal expanded on the R v Ferris authority for not using such statements as an admission of guilt if you cannot determine its meaning as a whole.
OVERVIEW
...he was convicted of first degree murder in the deaths of Caleb and Bridget.
[3] Ms. Merritt was tried jointly with Mr. Fattore for first degree murder in the deaths of Caleb and Bridget, on the theory that she encouraged Mr. Fattore to murder them. The jury acquitted Ms. Merritt in the death of Bridget but found her guilty of first degree murder in the killing of Caleb.
[6] Ms. Merritt appealed...
...She also argued that the trial judge erred in his jury instruction relating to the use, as circumstantial evidence of her guilt, of her omission to mention in two police statements that on a family mall visit the evening before Caleb’s body was found, Mr. Fattore had gone to a Walmart store to purchase shoes (the “Walmart omissions”). Video evidence was subsequently presented at trial showing Mr. Fattore, alone, purchasing the shoes at the Walmart, as well as forensic evidence linking those shoes to Caleb’s killing.
The Initial Police Interviews
...She recounted her movements with Mr. Fattore the evening before, on August 22, 2013, telling the police that they went to Subway and the Pita Pit at a mall after going to a softball game. As indicated above, Ms. Merritt did not mention that while they were at the mall, Mr. Fattore went to the Walmart to buy shoes that would later be linked forensically to Caleb’s killing. However, there was no direct evidence confirming that Ms. Merritt knew that Mr. Fattore had done so.
Forensic Evidence
- DNA consistent with his own was found under Caleb’s clipped fingernails.
- Mr. Fattore could not be excluded from the mitochondrial DNA profile of a beard hair found on Caleb’s chest.
- Mr. Fattore’s DNA could not be excluded from samples taken from the inside of a latex glove collected from the garbage bin at his home days after Caleb was killed, and Caleb could not be excluded as the DNA source located on the outside of the glove.
- Walmart running shoes were found in Mr. Fattore’s garbage bin which contained a DNA profile similar to Mr. Fattore’s, as well as a dog hair consistent with a hair from Caleb’s dog. The police secured video footage of Mr. Fattore buying shoes at the Walmart the evening before Caleb’s murder.
- On January 1, 2014, after the police had caused Mr. Fattore to believe that they had linked him to Bridget’s killing with DNA, Mr. Fattore can be heard suggesting that the DNA must have been from his hair because Bridget did not touch him.
- On January 8, 2014, he said with respect to Caleb, “I killed him fuckin’ perfect”, or words to the effect of, “I killed him, then fuckin’ prove it”. Later that day he said, “I went in there and the fuckin’ coward didn’t fight”.
Ms. Merritt discussed strategies with Mr. Fattore to avoid his apprehension:
- They discussed, for example, what should be said about the Walmart shoes and how Mr. Fattore’s DNA could have been innocently transferred in relation to the deaths of Bridget and Caleb...
[31] After more than eleven hours, Mr. Fattore confessed to having killed Bridget and Caleb. He said that he killed them of his own initiative, without Ms. Merritt’s knowledge, because Ms. Merritt was always sad, crying, and anxious when the children were with the Harrisons.
The Airport Intercept Statement
Merritt: (whispers) You shouldn’t have said anything to them
Fattore: Huh
Merritt: You shouldn’t have said anythingFattore: (whispers) I was thinking about (unintelligible) and the children
Merritt: (whispers) (unintelligible) the audio tapes would’ve fucked us anyways.
I refer in these reasons to the last comment attributed to Ms. Merritt as the “airport intercept statement”.
THE ISSUES
The Merritt Appeal
C. Did the trial judge err in his charge to the jury on Ms. Merritt’s Walmart omissions?
ANALYSIS
Merritt Appeal: Did the trial judge err in his charge to the jury on the airport intercept statement?
Overview
[61] I agree with Ms. Merritt, and I am persuaded that this error was serious. The Crown was inviting the jury, in an otherwise problematic case, to treat the airport intercept statement as an admission by Ms. Merritt of her guilt in Caleb’s killing. As Rowe J. noted in R. v. Schneider, 2022 SCC 34, at para. 81, “juries are likely to give significant weight to confession-like evidence” and he noted that there is therefore “significant potential for prejudicial use of confessions” or party admissions “akin to a confession”. The risk of jury misuse of the airport intercept statement was real, and the consequences of misuse would have been devastating. I would therefore allow this ground of appeal.
The Principles of Law
[74] ...Obviously, it would be preposterous if partially inaudible statements were automatically excluded. Few witnesses can recall relevant conversations verbatim. It has long been established that where a witness can provide testimony about what a statement communicated, or there is context for assessing the meaning of words spoken, the evidence is admissible, with the weight of the statement being a matter for the trier of fact to determine: R. v. Bennight, 2012 BCCA 190, 320 B.C.A.C. 195; R. v. Buttazoni, 2019 ONCA 645, R. v. Hummel, 2002 YKCA 6, 166 C.C.C. (3d) 30. The ratio of Schneider is clear and can be expressed using Rowe J.’s words in para. 63: Where “there [is] sufficient context for the jury to give meaning to the words that [are] overheard, such that the evidence overcomes the low threshold for (logical) relevance,” a partially inaudible statement will be admissible, subject to exclusionary discretion.
[75] ...As I have explained, Rowe J. made clear in Schneider that the admissibility of incomplete statement evidence requires relevance, which is determined as a matter of logic and human experience by inquiring whether the evidence tends to increase or decrease the probability of the existence of a fact at issue: Schneider, at paras. 39, 76. If the meaning of a statement offered as an admission cannot be determined, it cannot logically increase or decrease the probability of the existence of a fact in issue and therefore does not meet even the low threshold of relevance.
[83] ...The trial judge’s charge is not reproduced by Rowe J., but it is available in the British Columbia Court of Appeal decision, reported at 2021 BCCA 41, 400 C.C.C. (3d) 131. In that direction, the trial judge advised jurors to bear in mind that the brother did not hear what was said before and after the words he overheard. He then told jurors to bear this in mind, “when you consider what, if any, weight can be given” to the brother’s evidence, following which he directed jurors that if they could not determine what Schneider meant by the overheard words, “[they] should ignore the evidence”: Schneider, 2021 BCCA 41, 400 C.C.C. (3d) 131, at para. 98 (emphasis added in first quote, original in second quote).
[101] In addition, Ms. Merritt was not only at risk of criminal liability on the murder charges. She was also in jeopardy as an accessory after the fact, and there are compelling reasons to believe that if she was acknowledging guilt in the airport intercept statement, this is what she was referring to....
[103] When defence counsel asked for such a direction, as recounted in para. 89 above, the trial judge refused. He took the position that it was not necessary to do so because the overall context could be of some significance in assisting jurors to determine what was said in the inaudible portion of the statement....
[115] However, none of these directions tells jurors anything about how to proceed if they cannot determine the meaning of the statement, “(unintelligible) the audiotape would’ve fucked us anyways”. It was necessary to do so.
Merritt Appeal: Did the trial Judge err in his charge to the jury on Ms. Merritt’s Walmart omissions?
Overview
[118] After-the-fact conduct evidence is evidence of conduct by the accused that “is consistent with the conduct of a guilty person and inconsistent with an innocent person”: R. v. White, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 72, at para. 19. For this reason jurors are told that before using after-the-fact conduct evidence as evidence of guilt, they must carefully consider and reject any innocent explanations for such conduct, and trial judges will assist jurors by reviewing possible innocent explanations.
[119] The Crown position was that Ms. Merritt did not tell the police about the purchase of the shoes in order to hide her own complicity in the killing. A competing possible innocent explanation on the charge of murdering Caleb was that Ms. Merritt did not tell the police about Mr. Fattore’s shoe purchase because she wanted to protect him from being held accountable for his guilt. Unless this innocent accessory after the fact explanation was rejected by the jury, the Walmart omissions could not stand as evidence that she was a party to Caleb’s murder.
The Material Facts
The Jury Charge
You may find the account that Mr. Fattore gave to Sergeant King to be quite inconsistent with Mr. Fattore’s trial testimony....
...If you reject Mr. Fattore’s evidence which supports the alternative explanation for her fabrication, you should ask yourself whether there is any other evidence admissible in relation to Ms. Merritt which you think could support such an alternative reason for any fabrication which you have found. [Emphasis added.]
Before you can engage in this form of reasoning, you would also have to reject that Ms. Merritt was acting only as an accessory after the fact in doing so. As previously discussed, that could result from disbelief of Mr. Fattore’s evidence, which is the only direct evidence that Ms. Merritt was an accessory after the fact, and rejection of the submission that there is other evidence which shows that Ms. Merritt was not involved in the crime charged but was merely acting as an accessory after the fact. [Emphasis added.]
[129] I am persuaded that these objections were well taken. There are two related problems. First, it was an error for the trial judge to direct the jurors that they could reject the innocent accessory after-the-fact explanation if they rejected Mr. Fattore’s testimony and found there to be no other direct evidence that Ms. Merritt was not involved in the crime but was merely acting as an accessory after-the-fact. As I have explained, even in the absence of affirmative evidence supporting the innocent after-the-fact conduct inference, jurors could appropriately decide that they cannot reject the innocent accessory after-the-fact explanation because of the absence of evidence disproving it.
[130] Moreover, although the Crown does not have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the after-the-fact conduct is consistent only with guilt, accused persons are not required to present affirmative evidence consistent with their innocence. Yet the trial judge effectively invited jurors to reject the innocent accessory after the fact inference if there was no affirmative evidence supporting Ms. Merritt’s position. To be sure, a jury should consider the absence of affirmative evidence supporting an innocent inference in deciding whether to reject it, but in my view, it is inconsistent with the presumption of innocence to invite a jury to reject an innocent inference unless such affirmative evidence exists.
CONCLUSION
R v Kehoe, 2023 BCCA 2
[January 3, 2023] Gladue: Disconnection from Indigenous Culture is a Result of Assimilation Policies and Not a Reason to Discount Gladue Principles [Reasons by Marchand J.A. with Groberman and Hunter JJ.A. concurring]
AUTHOR’S NOTE: There has been some dispute in recent years whether Indigenous people who lost their connection to their culture should be entitled to Gladue mitigation against their sentence. Without giving credence to this proposition the idea was that whatever the majority culture did to their families in the past did not directly affect them because they grew up in the dominant Canadian culture. It was hidden with the logic of the need to establish a "connection" between the residential school system and accused. Of course, if you take one step back, the idea seems preposterous. In essence, this jurisprudence suggested that because assimilation was successful, then cultural genocide had no impact on the person's prospects of becoming a contributing member of society. In this decision, the BCCA rejected this line of reasoning explicitly. Direct causal links are not necessary between the background factors and the offence. Disconnection from Indigenous culture is evidence of assimilation policies affecting the person.
Introduction
Reasons for Sentence
[32] The Crown notes that none of the negative experiences in Mr. Kehoe’s youth were connected in any tangible way to his Indigenous heritage or the legacy of residential schools. The majority of the problems were occasioned by his stepfather’s lifestyle and connection to the drug trade. Further, Mr. Kehoe was not apprised of his Aboriginal heritage until recently.[33] In response, Mr. Kehoe’s counsel submits that the net should be cast more broadly. Simply put, Mr. Kehoe’s mother is of Aboriginal heritage. Women of that heritage have poor outcomes in our society. I accept that submission and that I should consider systemic and background factors that have played a role in bringing the Indigenous person before the court and may have a mitigating effect on moral blameworthiness.
[38] ...I have taken those factors into account, both as general background factors and factors to be considered under s. 718.2(e). I consider the nexus between Mr. Kehoe’s Aboriginal status and this offence to be limited.
Standard of Review
Gladue Principles
[A]ll available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.[Emphasis added.]
- The unique systemic or background factors that may have played a part in bringing the particular Indigenous offender before the courts; and
- The types of sentencing procedures and sanctions that may be appropriate for the offender in the circumstances given their particular Indigenous heritage or connection.
See Gladue at para. 66; Ipeelee at para. 59.
[41] In considering systemic and background factors, the judge must take account of all the surrounding circumstances, including “the unique circumstances of the offender as an aboriginal person,” and display sensitivity to and understanding of the “difficulties aboriginal people have faced with both the criminal justice system and society at large”: Gladue at para. 81; Ipeelee at paras. 59–60, 75.
[44] That said, no offence is so serious that it negates the need for a sentencing judge to consider s. 718.2(e) of the Code and Gladue principles: Ipeelee at paras. 84–85. In fact, absent an informed waiver, sentencing judges have a duty to consider s. 718.2(e) and Gladue principles in every case involving an Indigenous offender: Gladue at para. 82....
Discussion
[53] This position is highly problematic for two reasons.
[55] As a consequence of Canada’s colonial history and assimilationist policies, many Indigenous people have become disconnected from their ancestral communities, cultures, and associated positive social structures. This disconnection has contributed to the social and economic marginalization of Indigenous people in Canada, including their disproportionate interactions with the criminal justice system.
[56] Disconnection is one of the very harms associated with Canada’s colonial history and assimilationist policies that Gladue and Ipeelee seek to address. Accordingly, the Crown’s reasoning that Gladue principles should play a very limited role in this case because Mr. Kehoe was disconnected from his Indigenous culture, community and supports subverts the remedial purpose of s. 718.2(e) of the Code and penalizes Mr. Kehoe for the success of Canada’s destructive policies.
[57] Second, when determining whether and how Gladue principles applied to Mr. Kehoe, the issue was never whether he was disconnected from his Métis community, culture and supports. Rather, the issues were: (1) the role Canada’s colonial history and post-colonial assimilationist policies played in causing that disconnection; and (2) the role that disconnection played in his coming before the court.
[60] I have great respect for the privileged position, experience and wisdom of the sentencing judge and a full appreciation of the challenging circumstances he faced. Nevertheless, in my view, he erred in principle. In relying on the Crown’s submission that Gladue principles should play a very limited role because Mr. Kehoe is disconnected from his Métis community and culture, the judge erred in law and failed to consider the role Canada’s colonial history and assimilationist policies may have played in bringing Mr. Kehoe before the court.
Sentence
R v Strongeagle, 2023 ABCA 5
[January 10, 2023] Circumstantial Identification Evid [Patricia Rowbotham, Jo'Anne Strekaf, and Kevin Feehan JJ.A.]
AUTHOR’S NOTE: The law is simple, yet court continue to get it wrong. In a circumstantial case (particularly a circumstantial ID case), any reasonable conclusion available on the evidence that does not point to the culpability of the accused should result in an acquittal. Here, prior surveillance identification of the accused behind the wheel of a vehicle associated to a person who committed a car jacking when that vehicle was in close proximity cannot establish on the criminal standard that the accused was the driver at the time.
Introduction
[2] The Crown concedes the appeal on the conviction for possession of the stolen Honda CR- V. The trial judge was mistaken when she concluded that the Crown had proved that the Honda CR-V was stolen because it had been identified by its Vehicle Identification Number. There was no evidence adduced about the Vehicle Identification Number.
Background
...While in the Toyota 4Runner on the gravel road, Mr Volciuc saw a black truck in the rear-view mirror and given his discussion with Ms Benedict, it was assumed it was her boyfriend. In actuality, it was the undercover officer. Ms Benedict stopped the Toyota 4Runner and told Mr Volciuc that he had “to walk alone from here”. He complied as he was not sure if Ms Benedict’s boyfriend, who he believed may be in the truck, would hurt him and he feared for his life. Ms Benedict drove away in the Toyota 4Runner. The undercover officer approached Mr Volciuc and drove him back to Calgary.
[7] In convicting the appellant of robbery of the Toyota 4Runner, the trial judge relied on circumstantial evidence that the appellant continued driving the Honda CR-V after the police last identified him as the driver at around 7:20 p.m., several hours before Ms Benedict met Mr Volciuc. The trial judge concluded that even though the appellant was not in the immediate vicinity when the robbery of the Toyota 4Runner occurred, he was a party to the robbery because she inferred he drove Ms Benedict to Copperfield in the Honda CR-V, which facilitated the robbery. The trial judge also drew an inference that the appellant was operating the Honda CR-V while it drove in tandem behind the Toyota 4Runner, and that the driver of the Honda CR-V was working in concert with Ms Benedict as she drove the Toyota 4Runner.
Discussion
[9] The Crown acknowledges that the only identification evidence of the appellant as the driver of the Honda CR-V occurred at 6:18 p.m. and 7:20 p.m. There is no evidence identifying him thereafter, including during the drive to Copperfield at approximately 9:30 p.m. or following Ms Benedict in the stolen Toyota 4Runner afterwards.
[10] To convict the appellant of being a party to the robbery when the only identification of him occurred hours before the robbery is not the only reasonable conclusion on this record. Given the gaps in the evidence, it was not a reasonable inference for the trial judge to conclude that the appellant was operating the Honda CR-V at the relevant times to ground his conviction for robbery.
Where an appeal is allowed on the ground of an error of law, the exercise of discretion to direct a new trial pursuant to s 686(2) depends on whether there was evidence upon which a properly instructed jury might have convicted. If there is no evidence of an essential element of the charge, the court will direct an acquittal because an accused shall not “be again placed in jeopardy after the Crown has failed to prove his guilt in order to give the Crown another opportunity to convict him”: R v NW, 2013 ABCA 393 at para 17 citing R v More (1959), 1959 CanLII 447 (BC CA), 124 CCC 140 (BC CA) at 149-150, 31 CR 59.