This week’s top three summaries: R v Clark, 2022 SCC 49: #eye-witness ID, R v McDonald, 2022 ONCA 838: #silence and ineffective counsel, and R v Edama, 2022 ABCA 394: NCR absolute discharge.
This week's top case deals with eye-witness identification evidence. For great general reference on the law of evidence, I recommend the Emond title below. It is available for purchase now for our readership with a 10% discount code provided below. To purchase, simply click on image below.
R v Clark, 2022 SKCA 36 [Minority Upheld Unanimously: 2022 SCC 49]
[Upheld at SCC: November 30, 2022] Eye-witness Identification: Social Media Pictures and In-Dock Identification [Mr. Justice Leurer]
AUTHOR’S NOTE: In today's social-media connected world, it is often the case that anyone can connect a name with an image of a person. Given the frailties of eye-witness identification in general, where such a process occurs prior to the in-dock identification of an accused in court, there are significant reasons for concern. Factors related to such an identification may require a strong caution with the jury being told that it would be "very dangerous" to attribute any greater degree of certainty to the in-court identification than to the prior identification evidence communicated to police. Here the witness became very sure in court whereas her prior personal investigation caused her to be very cautious in her degree of certainty presented to the police.
Leurer J.A. (in dissent)
I. INTRODUCTION
[62] At the trial, Mr.Williams testified that he witnessed Mr.Durocher’s friend strike Mr. Durocher one time. Later, the police found Mr. Durocher beaten to death. I will return to discuss, in detail, Mr. Williams’s testimony, but it is useful to understand that, on the night Mr. Durocher was killed, Mr. Williams was strung out on drugs. As I will explain, after the police were called, Mr. Williams had only a limited ability to describe Mr. Durocher’s assailant and he was never asked by the police to identify that person through a photo line-up. However, at trial, he unequivocally fingered Mr. Clark as the assailant.
[68] The evidence was that Mr. Clark had previously lived with Mr. Durocher. For this reason, there were circumstances, other than Mr. Clark’s presence on the night in question, that might explain the appearance of these two objects at the crime scene.
[69] At trial, both Mr. Williams and Ms. Holmgren described how Mr. Durocher’s friend drank from, and discarded, a disposable water bottle given to him by Ms. Holmgren. A disposable water bottle was found at the crime scene. It was not initially perceived by the police to have evidentiary value. This thought changed after Ms. Holmgren and Mr. Williams gave their statements. The bottle was then seized and tested. However, the evidence could not establish how long Mr. Clark’s DNA had been on the bottle or how long it had been at the campsite. As well, although Mr. Williams and Ms. Holmgren testified that they saw Mr. Durocher’s friend drink from a water bottle, neither identified the bottle entered into evidence as being similar to, let alone the same type as, that given to Mr. Durocher’s friend that night. This fact was commented on by the judge in his jury charge.
[70] The same problems exist with respect to the hat. In his charge, the judge specifically reminded the jury in relation to this hat that there “is evidence that Mr. Clark had been at Mr. Durocher’s residence a number of times in the past”. No witness identified the hat as being worn by Mr.Durocher’s friend. As well, the evidence was inconclusive as to whether Mr. Durocher’s assailant was even wearing a hat at all.
[71] These frailties in the circumstantial evidence justify the judge’s decision to tell the jury that the case against Mr. Clark depended “almost entirely” on the evidence of Mr. Williams and Ms. Holmgren.
III. LEGAL PRINCIPLES: HIBBERT INSTRUCTIONS
[26] The Supreme Court of Canada in Hibbert found that the trial judge should have cautioned the jury more strongly that the identification of the accused in court was highly problematic as direct reliable identification of the perpetrator of the offence. The Court noted the danger associated with eyewitness in-court identification is that it is deceptively credible, largely because it is honest and sincere. An instruction that such identification should be accorded “little weight” was found not to go far enough to displace the danger that the jury could still give it weight that it does not deserve. Moreover, it should also have been stressed that the impact of the victim having seen the accused arrested by the police as her alleged assailant could not be undone. And this was so even though the trial judge had addressed the frailties of the identification evidence. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.(Footnotes omitted)
[75] Ms. McLeod had been unable to positively identify the accused in the photo line-up but had indicated that she may have encountered him at some point in the past. At the second trial, she was asked if she was able to recognize the man who assaulted her as being a person in the courtroom. Crown counsel invited Ms. McLeod to identify Mr. Hibbert, telling her that it was “important for the jury to know, Mrs. McLeod, whether or not you are able to identify your attacker and not someone that you have seen subsequently, do you understand?” (at para 12). In response to this invitation, Ms. McLeod identified Mr. Hibbert.
[76] The police also showed Ms.Baker a photo line-up. She told investigators that Mr. Hibbert’s image in the photo line-up “resembled the person she saw but she could not be positive” (at para 15). At the preliminary hearing and the first trial, she had identified Mr. Hibbert as the perpetrator. At the second trial, she was specifically asked if she recognized the person she saw that day, “not as someone she had seen in photographs, on television news, or at any other time, but as the man she saw on the day of the attack”. Ms. Baker replied that she “recognize[d] him in the box” (at para 16).
[36] Clearly, the evidence of the prior descriptions given and the prior identifications made by the identifying witness constitute prior consistent statements made by that witness. Generally speaking, evidence that a witness made prior consistent statements is excluded as irrelevant and self-serving. However, where identification evidence is involved, it is the in-court identification of the accused which has little or no probative value standing alone. The probative force of identification evidence is best measured by a consideration of the entire identification process which culminates with an in-court identification: e.g. R. v. Langille, supra, at 555; Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364 (2d cir. 1925) at 369, per Hough J., concurring; Clemons v. United States, 408 F.2d 1230 (D.C. cir. 1968) at 1243. The central importance of the pre-trial identification process in the assessment of the weight to be given to identification evidence is apparent upon a review of cases which have considered the reasonableness of verdicts based upon identification evidence: e.g. see R. v. Miaponoose (1996), 110 C.C.C. (3d) 445 (Ont. C.A.).[37] If a witness identifies an accused at trial, evidence of previous identifications made and descriptions given is admissible to allow the trier of fact to make an informed determination of the probative value of the purported identification. The trier of fact will consider the entirety of the identification process as revealed by the evidence before deciding what weight should be given to the identification made by the identifying witness. Evidence of the circumstances surrounding any prior identifications and the details of prior descriptions given will be central to that assessment.(Emphasis added, footnote omitted)
V. ANALYSIS
A. Mr. Williams’s testimony
[114] In the second police interview, Mr.Williams described the assailant as having a complexion that was both “white and brown, kind of mixed” and with “maybe bad skin”, but he added that “it was dark, and it was hard to see”. When asked to explain what he meant by “white and brown”, Mr. Williams said that “it could have been his facial hair”. By the time of this second interview, Mr. Williams could not recall if the assailant was wearing a hat.
[115] Of note is the fact that the police never showed Mr. Williams a photo line-up, nor was Mr. Williams otherwise ever asked to identify the assailant from a photograph. This is the case even though, as already noted, Ms. Holmgren came forward with a photograph showing who she thought was the man she had been introduced to that evening.
[116] According to this evidence, by the time Mr. Williams presented himself in court to testify, he had never made a visual identification of Mr. Clark as Mr. Durocher’s assailant. Moreover, the descriptive information he provided was of limited quality and was inconsistent.
[117] The fact that there is no evidence that Mr. Williams visually identified Mr. Clark before testifying, and the fact that his descriptions of the assailant were problematic on their own, demanded that the jury be strongly, and specifically, cautioned that the in-court identification by Mr. Williams had limited, if any, evidentiary value....
[122] ...This response led Crown counsel to attempt to elicit a description of that person’s distinguishing characteristics. The following exchange occurred:
Q So why was Ryan reminding you of somebody that you knew? What are the characteristic [sic]?
A Just, I guess, the mouth and the -- the nose. Just --
Q Okay.
A -- that’s all I could see. I don’t know. I can’t remember the way -- how he was speaking or whatever. It’s just -- it’s been two years, right? It’s just --
Q And if you make an effort, Mr. Williams, about the speech, what is it that you say that is particular about his speech?
A I don’t know.
Q So by -- like, if he was in the courtroom today, would you recognize him? A I don’t know.
Q Why?
A Just -- I’d recognize him.Q Do you see him in the courtroom? A Oh, yeah. Yeah.
Q Where -- where is he?
A Right there.Q Are you showing the person behind me?
A Yeah.
MS. GAGNON: The witness is identifying the accused.
[126] Taken together, these circumstances demanded that not only should the judge have reviewed the evidence in detail, but jurors should have been cautioned in the strongest terms that they should approach Mr. Williams’s in-court identification of Mr. Clark with extreme caution and have been told why this is the case. This was a situation where more should have been said than that this evidence had “little weight” – to use the term that was deemed insufficient in Hibbert. As in Tebo, even “assuming the jury was entitled to consider [Mr. Williams’] in-dock identification at all, this was a case where the jury should have been forcefully told that they could give virtually no weight to it” (at para 19).
B. Ms. Holmgren’s testimony
[131] Less than two minutes later, Mr. Williams pulled up beside her vehicle. He told her that “that guy jumped Chris”. The two discussed what to do, leading them to leave the scene. Her description of the remaining events from the early morning generally aligned with that given by Mr. Williams.
[132] Ms. Holmgren and Mr. Williams slept at her parent’s home in Meath Park. She woke up after 8:00 a.m. By this point, Mr. Williams had attempted, without success, to reach Mr. Durocher using Ms. Holmgren’s telephone. Ms. Holmgren connected with a friend, Gail Bradfield. Ms. Holmgren, Mr. Williams, and Ms. Bradfield set out to Mr. Durocher’s campsite. Ms. Holmgren was driving.
[134] Ms. Holmgren gave two statements to the police on October 2, 2016. The first was given at 4:32 in the afternoon. At that time, Ms. Holmgren told the interviewing officer that she had been introduced to Mr. Durocher’s friend but “didn’t pay attention”. She said that the person was wearing a white and red t-shirt and had “blond hair or sandy blond hair” and, she thought, curls. She also added that she had been told by Mr. Williams that the person had a scruffy beard, but she did not remember that.
Q MS. GAGNON: So, Heather, if I ask you today to identify in the courtroom, if he’s here, maybe he’s not, the -- the guy that you saw with Chris the night of the murder, that Ryan that you just identified on your Facebook. Do you see him in the courtroom?
A Yes, I do.
Q Could you point at him, please?
A He’s right there.
MS. GAGNON: So for the record, the witness is pointing at the accused.
[140] The evidence relating to Ms. Holmgren’s report to the police about the Facebook photos compounds these concerns. As I have reviewed, when Ms. Holmgren presented the results of her investigation to the police, she stated that she was “pretty sure it’s him. I would have to say, like, 90 percent sure, but I’m not good with faces and names”. She also noted differences in the appearance of the person in the Facebook pages and the person she recalled seeing that previous night. Finally, to underscore the level of her uncertainty, she asked the police to show the photographs to Mr. Williams so he could verify if the person she saw on the Facebook page was the same person she had met the evening before.
[141] In contrast to the uncertainty that Ms. Holmgren had expressed when she presented the photographs to the police, her in-court identification was emphatic and unqualified. She literally pointed to Mr. Clark as the person whom she had met with Mr. Durocher.
[144] In the context of this case, Ms. Holmgren’s confident unqualified in-court identification had the potential to be particularly pernicious. As I have explained, the Crown’s case was tenuous. While the Crown was entitled to rely on the totality of the evidence to suggest that the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was met, the risk remains that jurors may have thought that it was safe to convict on the strength of Ms. Holmgren’s evidence alone. Even leaving aside the other problems with Ms. Holmgren’s identification of Mr. Clark, a statement that a witness is “pretty sure”, or even “90 percent sure” does not meet the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See R v Lifchus, [1997] 3 SCR 320 at paras 30–32 and Starr at para 242.
[145] For these reasons, the circumstances of this case required the judge to caution the jury about the in-dock identification that Ms. Holmgren had made and also instruct them that it would be very dangerous to attribute to Ms. Holmgren’s in-court identification of Mr. Clark any degree of certainty greater than what she had communicated to police on October 2, 2016.
C. The charge the jury received
You must be very careful about relying on eyewitness testimony to find Ryan Clark guilty of any criminal offence. Innocent people have been wrongly convicted because reliance was placed on mistaken eyewitness identification. Even a number of witnesses can be honestly mistaken about identification. Eyewitness identification may seem more reliable than it actually is because it comes from a credible and convincing witness who honestly, but mistakenly, believes that the accused person is the one he or she saw involved in the offence. There is little connection between the great confidence of the witness and the accuracy of the identification. Even a very confident witness may be honestly mistaken. A very confident witness may be entirely wrong with respect to his or her identification evidence.
Eyewitness identification is a conclusion based on the witness’s observations. The reliability of the identification depends on the basis for the witness’s conclusion.
D. The adequacy of the charge
Had Mr. Williams expressed uncertainty about his identification? It would appear you could safely say that Mr. Williams was not as confident in his identification of Mr. Clark, as was Ms. Holmgren at the time of the trial.
[33] In his charge concerning the general frailties of eyewitness identification evidence, the trial judge told the jury that witnesses can be honest and convincing and yet be mistaken. Later, however, when discussing specific identification witnesses, the trial judge invited the jury to consider how sure they were of their identification. In reality, there is a “very weak link between the confidence level of a witness and the accuracy of that witness”: R. v. Hibbert, supra, per Arbour J. at p. 148. Indeed, certainty on the part of an honest identification witness is part of the reason that eyewitness identification evidence is dangerous. In my opinion, in the circumstances of this case, instead of mentioning certainty as a measure of reliability, it was incumbent upon the trial judge to explain the tenuous relationship between the confidence level of the identification witnesses and the accuracy of their evidence. Unfortunately, he did not do so.(Emphasis added)
I would reach the same conclusion in this case.
VI. Conclusion
R v McDonald, 2022 ONCA 838
[December 1, 2022] Ineffective Assistance: the Right to Silence, Settlement Privilege and Providing Defence Statements to the Crown [Reasons by J. George J.A. with S.E. Pepall and A. Harrison Young JJ.A. concurring]
AUTHOR’S NOTE: Sometimes the assistance provided by lawyers to criminally charged persons truly boggles the mind. This case provides a master class in what never to do related to an accused's version of events. In sum, the lawyer provided a written statement of the accused to the Crown during settlement discussions before trial without insisting on settlement privilege. The Crown then crucified the accused on the stand and in argument using that very same statement. Defence counsel never got informed instructions for any part of this process. In effect, defence counsel breached the accused right to silence. Settlement privilege allows discussions about the accused's version of events without such risk. Marking your communication "without prejudice" should identify it as subject to such privilege, objecting when it is presented in court is necessary, and in reality there should never be a need of you to provide a document written by your client about the incident to the Crown in settlement discussions - a letter from you outlining such version in hearsay should be sufficient. The only silver lining is that if counsel messes up to this degree, the ineffective assistance appeal writes itself.
George J.A.:
Overview
Evidence at Trial
Complainant
Melody
[8] ...Melody testified that at around 2:00 p.m. on November 6, the complainant sent her an “SOS” text message. She then called the complainant, who was upset and crying. The complainant advised her that she had been “in a fight”, that her jaw was broken, and that she was in considerable pain. The complainant also sent Melody a photograph via text depicting her injuries. The complainant eventually told her that it was the appellant who struck her and caused the injuries. The complainant, however, implored Melody to not confront the appellant about this or to let him know that she had disclosed this to her.
Appellant
Ineffective assistance of trial counsel
Decision Below
Fresh Evidence
Analysis
B) Whether the appellant received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel
Facts underlying the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
Do the facts support a finding that trial counsel’s assistance was incompetent?
[28] Perhaps more importantly, she made fundamental decisions without instructions. It was essential that the appellant understand that he enjoyed the right to silence and that he did not have to provide any information to the Crown. The appellant did not (and could not reasonably have been expected to) understand this, and trial counsel took no steps to ensure he did.
Did the appellant suffer a miscarriage of justice?
...His explanation for why his statement differed from his testimony in several respects did not strike [me] as honest. The Crown also submits that his testimony evolved as it went on. He said that he recalled things spontaneously, but in some cases these things came up after a more direct question or even after a break in court. In the Crown’s submission, [the accused’s] testimony did not present as an honest and forthright recall but, rather, a carefully crafted story.
Disposition
R v Edama, 2022 ABCA 394
[December 5, 2022] NCR: Review Board and Obligation to Consider Absolute Discharge [Crighton, Strekaf, and Khullar JJ.A.]
AUTHOR’S NOTE: This case reinforced the obligation of the Review Board to "search out and consider evidence favouring his or her absolute discharge." Too often in the history of treatment of persons designated Not Criminally Responsible, the punishment for such a designation has extended beyond the punishment they would have served had they simply pled guilty to the offence as charged. The underlying facts of this case show exactly how such a thing could happen with Review Boards maintaining control over the liberty of people who are not dangerous to themselves or the community at large. This case is part of a series of ABCA cases that tries to remind the Board to comply with its legal obligations when it comes to absolute discharges.
The Court
[2] This appeal is the latest in a series of decisions reviewed by this Court where an accused found not criminally responsible (NCR accused) on account of mental disorder under s 672.34 of the Criminal Code challenges the reasons and disposition of the Alberta Review Board for finding him or her to remain a significant threat to the safety of the public under s 672.54: R v Jones, 2019 ABCA 313, 378 CCC (3d) 77; R v WCR, 2019 ABCA 170, 91 Alta LR (6th) 231; R v Ferzli, 2020 ABCA 272, [2020] AJ No 775 (QL); R v HMH, 2021 ABCA 118, 404 CCC (3d) 71; R v Leonce, 2021 ABCA 270, [2021] AJ No 1018 (QL). Those cases have emphasized that when applying the framework for a disposition under s 672.45 set out in Winko v British Columbia (Forensic Psychiatric Institute), [1999] 2 SCR 625, [1999] SCJ No 31, the Alberta Review Board must itself grapple with whether the NCR accused is at the time of the hearing a “significant threat to the safety of the public”.
[3] While the Review Board is a specialized, expert body and its decisions are owed deference, the Review Board's reasons must be able to withstand a "somewhat probing examination" to determine whether the decision is justifiable, transparent, and intelligible: Gibson (Re), 2022 ONCA 527 at para 10, [2022] OJ No 3193 (QL). It is never sufficient for the Review Board to recite the recommendations of the treatment team and accept them as being dispositive of the test without assessing that opinion against the evidence and analyzing the significant risk test as it relates to the mental health of the NCR accused and the risk posed to the public: HMH at para 31; Leonce at para 60. A conclusory statement that the appellant represents a significant risk to the safety of the public is insufficient: WCR at para 5.
[7] At the appellant’s annual review on May 21, 2021, his treatment team assessed his overall risk to the public as moderate if he were to be granted an absolute discharge and stated that his history suggested he is more likely to manifest violence as a defensive or reactive measure in response to a perceived threat. Based on the evidence at the hearing, the Review Board granted the appellant a conditional discharge and directed he be moved out of the hospital immediately, stating in its reasons that administrative convenience was not an acceptable reason to keep him residing in the hospital.
[8] After a series of positive drug tests, the appellant voluntarily returned to hospital and was then transitioned back to Journey Home. In November 2021, because of his positive drug tests, the treatment team sought an earlier review that was originally scheduled for February 2022. The hearing proceeded on April 13, 2022. At the time of the hearing, the appellant’s drug tests were negative, and he was reported to be medication compliant. He had not experienced any symptoms of psychosis since late 2018 and there is agreement that his mental illness is now in remission.
[9] At the April 13, 2022 review hearing...
...the treatment team’s conclusion was:
A review of his history suggests Mr. Edama is unlikely to engage in aggression or violence unless he is experiencing symptoms of psychosis. Mr. Edama’s history demonstrates that when psychotic he can develop paranoid delusional beliefs and respond in a violent manner. Mr. Edama’s history indicates he decompensates in the context of cannabis use or medication non-compliance, or a combination of these factors.
Finally, we note that over a period of five months, Mr. Edama has breached Board conditions on four occasions. Given the knowledge that substance abuse significantly elevates the risk of violent offending, and in light of that fact [that] Mr. Edama’s illness makes him susceptible to cannabis abuse, Mr. Edama clearly poses a significant threat to the safety of the public and this risk has increased with his ongoing cannabis use.
[11] The Review Board’s reasons contain no analysis of the significant risk test as it related to the mental health of the appellant and the risk posed to the public; rather, the Review Board simply accepted the opinion of the treatment team without assessing that opinion against the evidence.
[12] ...The previous relapse by the appellant into cannabis use in the fall of 2021 was brief, did not involve violence, and he did not destabilize mentally at that time. Nor is there any evidence linking the appellant’s cannabis use to episodes of violence: as stated earlier, the appellant’s history suggests he is more likely to manifest violence as a defensive or reactive measure in response to a perceived threat, and not because of his abuse of cannabis. There are only two established episodes of violence in the appellant’s history, both of which occurred in 2014. Finally, the test is not whether the appellant's behaviour could lead to decompensation and therefore the risk of serious harm, but whether there is evidence to support a positive finding that there is a significant threat to public safety.
[14] Moreover, the evidence does not support the suggestion that the appellant is medication non-compliant. The reports show that the appellant has consistently been taking his medication for over two years now, and the only evidence indicating some medication compliance problems were reports from the group home staff that they needed to remind him several times to take his medication. The appellant’s reasons for resisting a depot injection appear to be due to unpleasant side effects he experienced and not because of his resisting to taking anti-psychotic medication. Preferring an oral form of medication over an injectable form is not evidence that the appellant is a significant danger to the public.
[17] ...A decision will be unreasonable if the reasons for it, read holistically, fail to reveal a rational chain of analysis: Vavilov at para 103.
[19] This Court may set aside an order of the Review Board where it is of the opinion that: (a) the decision is unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence, or (b) where the decision is based on a wrong decision on a question of law, or (c) where there has been a miscarriage of justice: R v Owen, 2003 SCC 33 at para 31, [2003] SCJ No 31 (QL); Leonce at para 52; s 672.78(1) of the Criminal Code. On this record, the Review Board’s conclusion that the appellant presented a significant threat to the safety of the public was unreasonable.
[20] In our view, the Review Board failed to consider evidence favouring an absolute discharge and had it done so, it could not have concluded the appellant presents a significant threat to the safety of the public. There is no doubt the appellant has ongoing mental health issues that he has acknowledged. His mental health condition is not determinative of his risk. The appellant has had relapses in using cannabis contrary to the conditions placed upon him and has become irritable and perhaps agitated. This falls short of the serious risk that goes beyond the merely trivial or annoying that is required to justify restricting the appellant’s liberty. The appeal is therefore allowed.